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Notes 
A CONTINUING CONUNDRUM: APPLYING 
CONSISTENT GENDER-NEUTRAL CRITERIA 
TO FEDERAL SENTENCING DEPARTURES 
BASED ON FAMILY TIES AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES  
I.  INTRODUCTION  
Under the federal sentencing regime, district court judges must first 
consult the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”) in order 
to determine a defendant’s sentence.1  However, a defendant may move 
for a downward departure from that sentencing range based on family 
ties and responsibilities.2  In doing so, the defendant asks the judge to 
decrease his or her sentence in light of the important role that the 
defendant plays in the family unit.3  
Take for example three defendants who reside in different 
jurisdictions and received convictions for the same offense, conspiracy to 
distribute marijuana.4  All three defendants are prosecuted under federal 
law, all are first time offenders with no other criminal history, and all 
move for downward departures based on their family ties and 
responsibilities.5  The first defendant, Linda Smith, resides in New 
Mexico and is the sole financial provider for her unemployed husband 
and three children under the age of eight, one of whom suffers from a 
                                                 
1 See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of how district courts utilize the Guidelines 
for sentencing determinations). 
2 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (providing 
that family ties and responsibilities is not an “ordinarily relevant” basis for departure); see 
also infra Part II.C (discussing downward departures based on family ties and 
responsibilities in federal sentencing). 
3 See infra Part II.C (providing relevant history regarding downward departures based 
on family ties and responsibilities under the Guidelines). 
4 The following example is fictional and does not refer to actual convictions. 
5 Although courts consider many different factors in assessing sentencing 
determinations, the following example simplifies the sentencing process in order to 
highlight the issues related to sentencing departures based on family ties and 
responsibilities.  For this example, assume that each defendant would face the same 
potential term of imprisonment according to a proper calculation of the sentence under the 
Guidelines.  See infra Part II.A (providing an overview of the way in which district courts 
apply the Guidelines). 
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heart defect that requires attentive care.6  Linda works long hours to 
ensure that she can provide for her family, including the cost of medical 
bills, but also works hard to ensure that she plays an active role in her 
children’s lives.  The second defendant, John Doe, resides in New York 
and works two jobs to provide for his wife and two children.7  John’s 
oldest son, age five, has special needs, and John plays an active role in 
his son’s therapy and counseling.  The third defendant, Michelle 
Johnson, resides in Virginia and is a single mother of two children.8  
Michelle’s children, ages ten and thirteen, spend most of their time with 
their grandparents who reside in the same town.  
At sentencing, both Michelle and Linda successfully obtained family 
ties departures from the applicable guidelines sentence.  Although the 
courts in both John’s and Michelle’s hearings applied the same standard, 
the outcome was different.  At John’s hearing the judge determined that 
providing primary financial support was not enough to justify a family 
ties departure.  At Michelle’s hearing, on the other hand, the judge 
determined that Michelle’s status as the sole caretaker for two children 
warranted departure.9  Conversely, at Linda’s hearing, the judge 
determined departure was proper because the loss of Linda’s significant 
                                                 
6 Linda Smith’s residence in New Mexico places her within the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
District Court for the District of New Mexico.  In this jurisdiction, the court determines 
family ties and responsibilities departures based on whether the facts in a given case take 
the defendant’s situation out of the “ordinary.”  United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 
07-1602 JB, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008), aff’d, 304 Fed.App’x 694 (10th Cir. 
2008). 
7 John Doe’s residence in New York places him within the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
District Court for the Southern District of New York.  In this jurisdiction, the court 
determines family ties departures based on whether the facts of a given case will result in 
“exceptional hardship” to the defendant’s family upon incarceration.  United States v. 
White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
8 Michelle Johnson’s residence in Virginia places her within the jurisdiction of the U.S. 
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia.  Here, the court applies an “exceptional 
hardship” standard similar to the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York.  
See United States v. Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (E.D. Va. 2002) (recognizing that the 
Fourth Circuit utilizes the “exceptional hardship” standard when considering family ties 
departures (citing United States v. Bell, 974 F.2d 537, 539 (4th Cir. 1992)). 
9 The juxtaposition of John’s and Michelle’s cases highlight the issue of gender 
stereotyping undertones inherent in a judge’s exercise of discretion in departing based on 
family ties.  See supra Parts III.B.1–2 (analyzing judicial reliance on gender stereotypes in 
family ties departures).  Because the current family ties departure standard is largely 
subjective, judges are free to base their determinations on assumptions of male and female 
roles within the family unit rather than the actual roles played by individual defendants in 
their own respective families.  See Patricia M. Wald, “What About the Kids?”:  Parenting 
Issues in Sentencing, 8 FED. SENT’G REP. 137, 138 (1995) (recognizing the risk that sentencing 
judges may rely on gender stereotypes and view women as family caretakers over men 
when making sentencing determinations). 
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financial contributions rendered her family circumstances “out of the 
ordinary.”10   
Downward departures based on a defendant’s family ties have long 
been a controversial and murky area in federal sentencing.11  As 
evidenced in the above example, district courts lack a controlling 
standard by which to analyze family ties departures.12  Despite 
amendments to the Guidelines that might aid courts in applying 
consistent and meaningful family ties departures, courts often apply 
departure standards that fail to consider the devastating impact of a 
defendant’s incarceration on innocent family members.13  However, even 
district courts that successfully focus on this impact often fail to apply 
the departure standard in a meaningful and objective way.14  The current 
                                                 
10 This determination reflects the disparities that exist between similarly situated 
defendants attempting to move for downward departures based on family ties.  Although 
Linda and John share similar family circumstances, the courts in their jurisdictions apply 
dissimilar departure standards.  Thus, Linda is successful under her jurisdiction’s 
departure standard while John is not.  See infra Part III.A (analyzing unwarranted 
disparities resulting from the application of differing departure standards). 
11 See, e.g., Amy Farrell, Distinguishing Among the “Unhappys”:  The Influence of Cultural 
Gender Norms on Judicial Decisions to Grant Family Ties Departures, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 268, 
268–73 (2001) (analyzing family ties departures across three different legal standards); 
Placido G. Gomez, The Struggle Against Unwarranted Uniformity:  The Evolution of Federal 
Sentencing Departures Based on Extraordinary Family Circumstances the Case of Low-Level Drug 
Offenders, 21 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 77, 77–93 (1995) (arguing against unwarranted uniformity 
in family ties departure determinations); Myrna S. Raeder, Gender-Related Issues In a Post-
Booker Federal Guidelines World, 37 MCGEORGE L. REV. 691, 716–26 (2006) (arguing that 
family ties departures should focus on non-intuitive gender-related issues that would favor 
maintenance of the family); Dana L. Shoenberg, Departures for Family Ties and Responsibilities 
After Koon, 9 FED. SENT’G REP. 292, 292–95 (1997) (examining the effects of Koon v. United 
States on family ties departures); Tracy Tyson, Downward Departures Under the Federal 
Sentencing Guidelines:  Are Parenthood and Pregnancy Appropriate Sentencing Considerations?, 2 
S. CAL. REV. L. & WOMEN’S STUD. 577, 599–606 (1993) (arguing that sentencing judges 
should consider parental responsibilities and pregnancy in determining family ties 
departures); Jody L. King, Note, Avoiding Gender Bias in Downward Departures for Family 
Responsibilities Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 1996 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 273, 273–312 
(arguing that the exercise of wide discretion to depart based on family ties under the 
standard in Koon v. United States runs the risk of gender bias entering into federal 
sentencing). 
12 See infra Part II.C (providing the differing family ties departure standards in and 
among federal circuit courts following Koon v. United States and various amendments to the 
Guidelines section regarding family ties). 
13 See infra Part II.B (discussing the negative effects of incarceration on a defendant’s 
family as well as society). 
14 See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, Into the Twilight Zone:  Informing Judicial Discretion in Federal 
Sentencing, 57 DRAKE L. REV. 591, 594 (2009) (“If judicial discretion is to be consistent with 
serving justice in the criminal justice system, a judge must exercise discretion free from 
bias.”).  Ramirez notes that because federal judges bring a variety of personal and legal 
experiences to the bench, it is imperative that the judiciary recognize that judges’ 
unconscious or subconscious associations may influence decision making.  Id. at 594–95.  
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discretionary departure system results in unwarranted disparities 
between similarly situated defendants and judicial reliance on gender 
stereotypes, contrary to the goals of uniformity and justice in the exercise 
of such discretion.15  
This Note begins by providing a brief history and overview of the 
Guidelines.16  Part II further looks to the harmful consequences faced by 
family members upon a defendant’s incarceration and explores the 
development of family ties departures under the Guidelines.17  Part III of 
this Note analyzes the flaws and disparities that have resulted from the 
lack of a uniform and objective family ties departure standard.18  Finally, 
Part IV recommends amending the Guidelines to reflect a uniform and 
objective family ties departure standard that would guide district courts 
in applying an objective departure analysis.19 
II.  BACKGROUND 
Judicial discretion, which is fundamentally inherent in the U.S. 
criminal justice system, is of utmost importance when federal district 
                                                                                                             
Another critic specifically recognizes that the exercise of judicial discretion to depart from 
the Guidelines could entail judicial application of gender bias.  King, supra note 11, at 274.  
King further asserts that application of gender bias in family ties departures would result 
in disparities between male and female offenders as women take on more family 
responsibilities compared to men.  Id. at 290–94.  Thus, King argues that courts should 
apply objective factors in assessing an offender’s family ties.  Id. at 300–02; see infra Parts 
III.B (analyzing the courts’ failure to objectively inquire into the effect of a defendant’s 
incarceration on his or her innocent family members). 
15 See infra Parts III.A–B (analyzing disparities in family ties departures between 
similarly situated defendants due to a lack of uniform departure standards and the 
presence of gender stereotyping in family ties departure decisions); infra note 33 
(discussing the Guidelines’ role in effectuating the goal of uniformity in sentencing); see also 
United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 246 (2005) (discussing the continuing importance of 
sentencing uniformity in judicial discretion exercised under the Guidelines).  One critic 
argues that eliminating bias from the exercise of judicial discretion is fundamentally 
important to achieving “any notion of justice.”  Ramirez, supra note 14, at 595.  The Model 
Code of Judicial Conduct (“Model Code”) further exemplifies this idea under canon 2, 
which requires that “[a] judge shall perform the duties of judicial office impartially, 
competently, and diligently.”  MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 2 (2010).  The 
Model Code also requires judges to “perform all duties of judicial office fairly and 
impartially” and “without bias or prejudice.”  Id. at R. 2.2, 2.3.  In doing so, the Model Code 
explains that “[a] judge who manifests bias or prejudice in a proceeding impairs the 
fairness of the proceeding and brings the judiciary into disrepute.”  Id. at R. 2.3 cmt. 
16 See infra Part II.A (explaining the history and operation of the Guidelines). 
17 See infra Parts II.B–C (discussing the harmful effects of incarceration on the family as 
well as the history of family ties departures). 
18 See infra Part III (analyzing the continuing flaws in the courts’ application of family 
ties departures). 
19 See infra Part IV (providing proposed amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6). 
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court judges maintain control over a defendant’s liberty through the 
sentencing process.20  The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in United States v. 
Booker brought the issue of judicial discretion to the forefront of the 
criminal justice system by restoring discretion in federal sentencing 
under the Guidelines.21  While federal judges maintain discretion over 
sentencing under the Guidelines, uniformity in sentencing remains a key 
component in federal criminal jurisprudence.22  This Note focuses on the 
exercise of judicial discretion to depart downward from the Guidelines 
based on a defendant’s family ties and concludes that courts have failed 
to apply a uniform and objective departure standard.23  
                                                 
20 Ramirez, supra note 14, at 594–95. Discretion is a crucial component of the justice 
system because the legislature typically drafts laws sufficiently general enough to 
encompass a wide variety of unlawful acts.  Id. at 594.  Further, the executive exercises 
great discretion in prosecuting individuals.  Id.  Thus, the judiciary must maintain 
discretion in order to restrain the power of the legislative and executive branches from 
becoming abusive.  Id.  In a sentencing context, one critic notes that “[t]he nature and 
degree of discretion accorded to a judge in determining the sentence of a convicted 
criminal offender bears directly on the coherence and the legitimacy of any criminal justice 
system.”  William W. Berry III, Discretion Without Guidance:  The Need to Give Meaning to 
§ 3553 After Booker and Its Progeny, 40 CONN. L. REV. 631, 633 (2008).  Berry contends that 
unlimited judicial sentencing discretion yields unsatisfactory consequences because it 
results in disparities between offenders with similar culpability.  Id.  However, completely 
eliminating this discretion would also yield unsatisfactory results because the role of the 
judge would be usurped, thus leading to unjust outcomes.  Id. 
21 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005).  The Court held that the once 
mandatory Guidelines are now advisory in nature and that federal sentencing judges 
should consider the Guidelines while “tailor[ing] the sentence in light of other statutory 
concerns.”  Id.; see Berry, supra note 20, at 650–61 (discussing the impact of Booker and its 
progeny on the Guidelines); see also infra Part II.C.2 (discussing Booker’s impact regarding 
family ties departures under the Guidelines).  Berry recognizes two major theories 
regarding the role the Guidelines played in sentencing after the Booker decision.  Berry, 
supra note 20, at 651–53.  Under the first approach, the Guidelines were considered 
mandatory for all intents and purposes despite the Court’s holding in Booker.  Id. at 651–52.  
On the other end of the spectrum, the second approach treated Booker as reviving the 
indeterminate sentencing regime that existed prior to the Guidelines.  Id. at 652–53. 
22 See Booker, 543 U.S. at 246 (“The . . . approach, which we now adopt, would (through 
severance and excision of two provisions) make the Guidelines system advisory while 
maintaining a strong connection between the sentence imposed and the offender’s real 
conduct—a connection important to the increased uniformity of sentencing that Congress 
intended its Guidelines system to achieve.”); see also Michael Goldsmith & Marcus Porter, 
Lake Wobegon and the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines:  The Problem of Disparate Departures, 69 GEO. 
WASH. L. REV. 57, 57–58 (2000) (discussing the importance of uniformity in federal 
sentencing).  The Guidelines were originally promulgated in response to what Congress 
viewed as widespread and unwarranted sentencing disparity.  Id. at 57–58.  The statutory 
scheme under which the Guidelines were promulgated was designed to promote 
uniformity in federal sentencing.  Id. at 58. 
23 For a discussion of the issues in courts’ application of family ties departures under the 
Guidelines, see infra Part III. 
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First, Part II.A provides the history and basic functioning of the 
Guidelines.24  Next, Part II.B looks to the detrimental effects of a 
defendant’s sentence on the defendant’s dependents and family 
members.25  Then, Part II.C explains federal sentencing jurisprudence 
concerning downward departures from the Guidelines based on a 
defendant’s family ties.26  Part II.C.1 discusses the way district courts 
have applied the Supreme Court’s departure standard in Koon v. United 
States to family ties departures.27  Part II.C.2 then describes how 
amendments to the Guidelines pursuant to the Prosecutorial Remedies 
and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act of 2003 
(“PROTECT Act”) and the Court’s decision in Booker have affected 
courts’ approaches to family ties departures in federal sentencing.28 
A. The United States Sentencing Guidelines 
Prior to the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”), federal judges 
practiced indeterminate criminal sentencing.29  Under this method, 
sentencing judges maintained broad discretion limited only by statutory 
minimum and maximum sentencing ranges established by Congress.30  
                                                 
24 See infra Part II.A (providing the history and function of the Guidelines).  This Note 
concentrates on the evolution of family ties departures over time; thus, this Note will refer 
to multiple sets of the Guidelines. 
25 See infra Part II.B (discussing the family harms associated with incarceration). 
26 See infra Part II.C (discussing family ties departures under the Guidelines). 
27 See infra Part II.C.1 (discussing the impact of the Koon decision on family ties 
departures). 
28 See infra Part II.C.2 (discussing amendments to the Guidelines pursuant to the 
PROTECT Act and Booker and their impact on family ties departures). 
29 Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, 98 Stat. 1837 (codified as amended 
in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.); Gilles R. Bissonnette, Comment, 
“Consulting” the Federal Sentencing Guidelines After Booker, 53 UCLA L. REV. 1497, 1502 
(2006); see Berry, supra note 20, at 636–37 (discussing the four main objectives of sentencing 
during the era of indeterminate sentencing).  The indeterminate sentencing system arose 
out of policy favoring rehabilitative opportunities for inmates. Bissonnette, supra, at 1502; 
see Berry, supra note 20, at 636–37 (listing the four objectives of indeterminate sentencing as 
retribution, incapacitation, rehabilitation, and deterrence).  Rehabilitation ideals reflected 
the belief that inmates should be given the opportunity to better themselves and become 
productive members of society.  Bissonnette, supra, at 1502.  In light of this goal, sentencing 
judges were free to determine “the goals of sentencing, the factors to be considered, and 
how much weight to accord [certain] factors, as well as the ultimate punishment” on a case-
by-case basis.  Id.  Thus, under this regime, Congress allowed the judiciary to consider 
virtually unlimited information in determining an offender’s sentence.  Berry, supra note 
20, at 635. 
30 Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502.  As long as the sentence fell within the range set by 
Congress, the sentence was afforded “virtually unconditional deference on appeal.”  Id.; see 
also Koon v. United States., 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (explaining how federal judges wielded 
wide discretion when deciding a criminal defendant’s sentence prior to the SRA). 
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However, because such discretion often resulted in unwarranted 
sentencing disparity, Congress enacted the SRA in an effort to increase 
uniformity in federal criminal sentencing.31  Through the SRA, Congress 
created the United States Sentencing Commission (“the Commission”) 
and charged it with creating a comprehensive set of sentencing 
guidelines aimed at decreasing disparity by providing suggested 
sentencing ranges for each class of persons convicted.32  The 
Commission, in turn, promulgated the Guidelines with the goal of 
uniformity in sentencing.33    
                                                 
31 See Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502–03 (discussing criticisms of the indeterminate 
sentencing regime); see also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, 
introductory cmt. 3 (2012) (providing Congress’ three primary objectives in enacting the 
SRA).  The introduction to the Guidelines provides that the SRA’s ultimate objective is to 
create an “effective, fair sentencing system” through uniformity, honesty, and 
proportionality in sentencing.  Id; see also Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (providing that federal judges’ 
once wide discretion in criminal sentencing led to the perception that similarly situated 
offenders received “unjustifiably” differing sentences); Sentencing Guidelines, 37 GEO. L.J. 
ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC., 667, 667 n.2033 (2008) (explaining that the federal sentencing 
system in place prior to the SRA received criticism, in part, for resulting in widely different 
punishments for similarly situated offenders).  Critics of indeterminate sentencing argued 
that it created an arbitrary system based on the whims of sentencing judges rather than the 
law.  Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1502; Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 57–58 
(arguing that the SRA is “designed to promote uniformity by curtailing judicial 
discretion”).  For example, Berry notes that indeterminate sentencing led to disparities and 
inconsistencies in sentencing due to unlimited judicial discretion combined with broad 
statutory sentencing ranges.  Berry, supra note 20, at 638.  One federal judge described 
judicial discretion under this regime as “almost wholly unchecked and 
sweeping . . . [which is] terrifying and intolerable for a society that professes devotion to 
the rule of law.”  Id.  (quoting Judge Marvin Frankel) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
32 Koon, 518 U.S. at 92.  Congress specifically charged the Commission with the task of 
“rationaliz[ing] the sentencing rules, to bring to bear the latest scientific studies in 
effectuating all of the purposes of punishment, and to do the kind of legwork in 
determining the appropriate sentencing practices that Congress had been unable or 
unwilling to do.”  Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1504–05.  Each class of “convicted persons” 
is determined by comparing offense behavior with offender characteristics.  U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 2 (2012). 
33 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 92 (discussing the history behind the Guidelines).  The SRA 
sought to remedy the “’unjustifi[ed]’ and ‘shameful’ consequences” of the indeterminate 
sentencing system, namely “the great variation among sentences imposed by different 
judges upon similarly situated offenders.”  Misretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 366 
(1988) (quoting S. Rep. No. 98-225 at 38, 65 (1983)). The Commission introduced the first set 
of Guidelines three years after President Ronald Reagan signed the SRA into law in 1984.  
Bissonnette, supra note 29, at 1505.  The SRA mandates that “[t]he Commission periodically 
shall review and revise . . . the guidelines” as part of its duties.  28 U.S.C. § 994(o) (2006).  
The Guidelines also provide that “[b]y monitoring when courts depart from the guidelines 
and . . . analyzing their stated reasons for doing so . . . the Commission, over time, will be 
able to refine the guidelines to specify more precisely when departures should and should 
not be permitted.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch.1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 
4(b) (2012); see also Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 62–66 (providing a brief historical 
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The Guidelines set forth forty-three base offense levels as well as six 
criminal history categories.34  These offense levels and criminal history 
categories, when collectively considered, culminate in a sentencing table 
containing designated sentencing ranges.35  The SRA originally 
mandated that district courts adhere to the Guidelines when determining 
an offender’s sentence.36  Under that application, the judge must first 
determine which base offense level correlates to the defendant’s 
statutory conviction.37  Once the judge accounts for adjustments, the 
judge must next determine the offender’s designated criminal history 
category.38  Finally, the judge must consult the sentencing table to 
                                                                                                             
background regarding the purpose, creation, and implementation of the Guidelines in 
federal sentencing).  
34 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, pt. A (2012) (setting forth the 
sentencing table).  To determine a defendant’s base offense level, the sentencing judge must 
look to the Guidelines provision that correlates to the defendant’s conviction.  Id. 
§ 1B1.1(a)(1).  The sentencing judge then determines the defendant’s criminal history 
category by calculating criminal history points based on factors such as prior sentences, the 
defendant’s age at the time of a prior offense, and whether the defendant commits an 
offense while currently serving a sentence.  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685–88. 
35 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 668.  To offer a simple example, suppose John 
Doe is convicted of voluntary manslaughter under 18 U.S.C. § 1112(a).  According to 
Guidelines section 2A1.3, a voluntary manslaughter conviction carries with it a base offense 
level of twenty-nine.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 2A1.3(a) (2012).  If this 
constitutes Doe’s first criminal offense, he would have zero criminal history points and fall 
within the first criminal history category.  See id. § 4A1.1 (providing the framework for 
calculating criminal history points); cf. id. ch. 5, pt. A (providing the sentencing table).  The 
offense level analyzed with the criminal history category in the sentencing table identifies 
that the applicable sentencing range is 87 to 108 months imprisonment.  Id. 
36 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) (2000).  Under the SRA: 
The court shall impose a sentence of the kind, and within the range, 
referred to in subsection (a)(4) unless the court finds that there exists 
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not 
adequately taken into consideration by the Sentencing Commission in 
formulating the guidelines that should result in a sentence different 
from that described. 
Id.  The mandatory nature of this provision was held unconstitutional by the Supreme 
Court in United States v. Booker.  543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005); see also infra Part II.C.2 
(discussing the Court’s ruling in Booker and its impact on the Guidelines). 
37 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B1.1(a)(1) (2012); Sentencing Guidelines, supra 
note 31, at 668.  A judge may also adjust the defendant’s base offense level according to 
“the defendant’s role in the offense,” “the defendant’s role in any obstructive conduct,” 
“the relationship between the counts of which the defendant was convicted,” “the 
defendant’s acceptance of responsibility for the offense,” and “the level of victim harm.”  
Id. at 668. 
38 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL §§ 1B1.1(a)(6), 4A1.1 (2012); Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685.  Each criminal history category in the sentencing table 
covers two to three criminal history points.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 5, 
pt. A (2012).  A defendant may receive an increase in his or her criminal history category if 
he or she has been previously convicted or if he or she “commits another offense while 
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determine the defendant’s applicable sentencing range.39  Because the 
Commission intended for each guideline range to carve out a 
“heartland” of typical cases correlating to the offense and the offender, 
district courts are only to consider whether a departure from the range is 
warranted in cases involving unusual or atypical circumstances.40  
The Commission also offers guidance as to what factual 
circumstances may warrant a departure from the Guidelines by 
categorizing potential factors as prohibited, encouraged, and 
discouraged for sentencing determination.41  A court may never consider 
                                                                                                             
serving any criminal justice sentence.”  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 685–88.  
Assignment of criminal history points is based on a defendant’s actual judgment rather 
than time served.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 4A1.2 cmt. n.2 (2012).   
39 Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 668; see U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, 
ch. 5, pt. A (2012) (providing the Guidelines sentencing table). 
40 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2012) 
(discussing departures from the Guidelines).  The Guidelines section that deals with 
departures states: 
(1) IN GENERAL.—The sentencing court may depart from the 
applicable guideline range if—  
(A) in the case of offenses other than child crimes and sexual 
offenses, the court finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1), 
that there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance; 
or 
(B) in the case of child crimes and sexual offenses, the court 
finds, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(2)(A)(i), that there 
exists an aggravating circumstance, 
of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into consideration by 
the Sentencing Commission in formulating the Guidelines that, in 
order to advance the objectives set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2), 
should result in a sentence different from that described. 
Id. § 5K2.0 policy statement. The Commission allowed for judicial discretion in departures 
even under the mandatory Guidelines because of the difficulty it faced in creating a set of 
guidelines that encompassed all conduct relevant to sentencing determinations.  Id. at ch. 1, 
pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b).  Further, the Commission does not believe that courts will 
depart from the Guidelines very often in light of the “heartland” concept.  Id.; see Koon v. 
United States, 518 U.S. 81, 93–94 (1996) (finding that the Commission did not adequately 
take unusual cases into consideration when promulgating sentencing guidelines so that 
atypical factors may provide a basis for departure).  Sentencing judges have discretion to 
depart upwards or downwards under certain circumstances but are required to explain 
their reasons for exercising such discretion in accordance with the Guidelines.  Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 695–96. 
41 Koon, 518 U.S. at 93–95.  The Commission precludes district courts from departing 
downward from the Guidelines based on prohibited factors.  Sentencing Guidelines, supra 
note 31, at 697; see infra note 42 (listing factors prohibited by the Commission for sentencing 
consideration).  Further, the Guidelines discourage downward departures based on the 
defendant’s personal attributes unless the case at hand is “exceptional.”  Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697; see infra note 44 (listing factors that are discouraged in 
sentencing consideration).  Finally, the Guidelines encourage downward departures based 
on mitigating factors.  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697; see infra note 43 (listing 
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certain factors, such as race or national origin, as a basis for departure.42  
However, a departure may be warranted when an encouraged factor is 
present to a significantly higher degree than already accounted for in the 
applicable guideline.43  Discouraged factors, on the other hand, are not 
typically relevant in considering whether a departure is warranted, and 
thus the Commission directs district judges to base departures on 
discouraged factors only in “exceptional” cases.44  A defendant’s family 
ties are not typically considered relevant in sentencing departures and 
thus are analyzed under this standard.45 
B. The Effects of Imprisonment on a Defendant’s Family Members and 
Dependents   
For defendants convicted and sentenced under the Guidelines, 
incarceration affects not only their own lives but the lives of their family 
members and dependents as well.46 Families often suffer intense 
                                                                                                             
factors that are encouraged in sentencing consideration).  Courts may also depart upwards 
from the Guidelines in limited circumstances where “aggravating factors [are] associated 
with the defendant’s conduct such as death, physical injury, extreme psychological injury, 
abduction or unlawful restraint.”  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 701–02. 
42 Koon, 518 U.S. at 93.  Prohibited factors include “race, sex, national origin, creed, 
religion, socioeconomic status,” “lack of guidance as a youth,” “drug or alcohol 
dependence,” and “economic hardship.”  Id. 
43 Id. at 95.  Because encouraged factors entail circumstances that the Commission may 
have taken into account when formulating a guideline, a court may also take these factors 
into account when it finds that the applicable guideline has not.  Id. at 94–95.  The 
Guidelines encourage departures based on mitigating factors, including “the victim’s 
conduct, lesser harm, coercion and duress, voluntary disclosure of an undiscovered 
offense, or diminished capacity in the commission of a nonviolent offense.”  Sentencing 
Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697–99.   
44 See Koon, 518 U.S. at 95 (providing a brief overview of the Commission’s commentary 
concerning discouraged factors).  The Guidelines discourage departures based on the 
defendant’s “age; educational or vocational skills; mental and emotional conditions; 
physical condition (including drug abuse or dependence); gambling addiction; 
employment record; family ties and responsibilities; and military, civic, charitable, or 
public service.”  Sentencing Guidelines, supra note 31, at 697 n.2101.  
45 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012); see infra Part 
II.C (discussing family ties departures under the Guidelines). 
46 See, e.g., Sarah Abramowicz, Rethinking Parental Incarceration, 82 U. COLO. L. REV. 793, 
811–15 (2011); Kimberly L. Alderman, The Long Arm of the Law:  Incarceration and the 
Ordinary Family, 55 HOW. L.J. 293, 294–96 (2012); Justin Brooks & Kimberly Bahna, “It’s a 
Family Affair”—The Incarceration of the American Family:  Confronting Legal and Social Issues, 
28 U.S.F. L. Rev. 271, 277–84 (1994); Eleanor Bush, Considering the Defendant’s Children at 
Sentencing, 2 FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 194–98 (1990); Susan E. Ellingstad, Note, The Sentencing 
Guidelines:  Downward Departures Based on a Defendant’s Extraordinary Family Ties and 
Responsibilities, 76 MINN. L. REV. 957, 980–81 (1992).  This impact is especially prevalent 
today as imprisonment rates have more than tripled in the last thirty years, with the prison 
population reaching its highest pinnacle in 2007 with one in every one hundred adult 
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emotional, financial, and physical difficulties upon the separation from a 
loved one due to incarceration.47  Specifically, incarceration of a family 
member severely impacts the individual’s children because the loss of a 
parent often damages a child’s psychological and financial well-being.48  
                                                                                                             
citizens incarcerated.  Alderman, supra, at 294; see Key Facts at a Glance, Imprisonment Rate 
Data Table, BUREAU JUST. STATS., http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/glance/tables/ 
incrttab.cfm (last updated Sept. 31, 2011) (showing that 139 in every 100,000 adult citizens 
were incarcerated in 1980 compared to 502 in every 100,000 incarcerated in 2009); see also 
PAUL GUERINO ET AL., U.S DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PRISONERS IN 2010 2 tbl.1 (2011), available at 
http://bjs.ojp.usdoj.gov/content/pub/pdf/p10.pdf (showing that 506 in every 100,000 
adult citizens were incarcerated in 2007). 
47 Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 280–81.  Brooks and Bahna explain that inmates’ 
families suffer harsh economic difficulties in losing the few resources at their disposal 
because incarceration often affects those families in the lowest socioeconomic position in 
society.  Id. at 280.  These families are also physically affected when forced to move from 
their homes and closer to those who are incarcerated.  Id.  In addition to physical family 
separation, incarceration of loved ones leads to family members feeling isolated while 
trying to cope with their loss.  Id. at 281.  Another critic poses that the exponential increase 
in imprisonment over the last thirty years has resulted in incarceration touching the lives of 
“all ordinary families” rather than only those that are socioeconomically disadvantaged.  
Alderman, supra note 46, at 294.  Alderman also explains that incarceration of one family 
member disrupts the family unit as a whole.  Id.  The private family sphere is intruded 
upon because family contact and support are regulated by the state while the family 
member is incarcerated.  Id. at 294–95.  Further, the incarcerated family member’s 
desocialization often leads to high divorce rates and further family disruption.  Id. at 295; 
Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 283. 
48 Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812.  In 2007, the number of minors with a parent in 
prison increased 79% since 1991 to a total of roughly 1.7 million minors affected.  LAUREN 
E. GLAZE & LAURA M. MARUSCHAK, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS 
SPECIAL REPORT:  PARENTS IN PRISON AND THEIR MINOR CHILDREN 1 (2008), available at 
http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/pptmc.pdf; SARAH SCHIRMER ET AL., THE SENTENCING 
PROJECT, INCARCERATED PARENTS AND THEIR CHILDREN:  TRENDS 1991–2007, at 2 (2009), 
available at http://sentengingproject.org/doc/publications/publications/inc_incarcerated 
parents.pdf.  That number represented 2.3% of minors in the United States.  GLAZE & 
MARUSCHAK, supra, at 1.  Between 1991 and 2007, the number of mothers in prison has 
grown 122% and the number of fathers in prison by 76%.   SCHIRMER ET AL., supra, at 2.  One 
critic notes that the effects of parental incarceration are most detrimental when a child is 
young but that the loss of a parent to incarceration is detrimental to a child at any age 
because he or she may experience behavior problems, low self-esteem, difficulty in school, 
and difficulty in maintaining relationships when older.  Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812.  
Thus, dependents with special needs would face additional difficulty in coping with a 
parent’s incarceration.  King, supra note 11, at 305–06.  Further, incarceration of the parent 
who provides primary financial support will cause extreme financial difficulties for the 
child.  Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 812; see GLAZE & MARUSCHAK, supra, at 17 app. tbl.9 
(showing that 67.2% of federal inmates provided primary financial support to their 
children and that 54% of state inmates provided primary financial support to their children 
in 2004).  Another critic recognizes that children of incarcerated parents often experience 
behavior problems similar to children whose parents die or divorce.  Brooks & Bahna, supra 
note 46, at 281.  This feeling of loss may cause children to experience educational and 
emotional problems, as well as feelings of anger and embarrassment.  Id. at 281–82.  
However, Abramowicz recognizes that a parent’s incarceration may benefit a child, 
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Children of incarcerated parents are more likely to face incarceration 
later in life as well.49  Although the defendant’s incarceration is seen as 
just punishment for the crimes committed, the effect of his or her 
imprisonment is often viewed as inflicting unwarranted harm on 
innocent family members.50    
Under the Guidelines, courts may consider the impact of 
incarceration on the defendant’s family members in determining the 
                                                                                                             
especially in cases involving a history of abuse or criminal activity.  Abramowicz, supra 
note 46, at 812; see SCHIRMER ET AL., supra, at 6 (“In some instances, such as a child living in 
a home where substance abuse was prevalent, the incarceration of a parent may actually 
result in a more stable environment for the child if a responsible relative is able to take on 
the child’s care.”). 
49 Alderman, supra note 46, at 295; Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 282; see also Deseriee 
A. Kennedy, Children, Parents & the State:  The Construction of a New Family Ideology, 
BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 78, 93 (2011) (noting that children of incarcerated parents 
have a higher chance of being incarcerated as adults); Tiffany J. Jones, Comment, Neglected 
by the System:  A Call for Equal Treatment for Incarcerated Fathers and Their Children—Will 
Father Absenteeism Perpetuate the Cycle of Criminality?, 39 CAL. W. L. REV. 87, 97 (2002) 
(providing that male youths whose fathers have been incarcerated are at an increased risk 
of incarceration). Kennedy notes that children of incarcerated parents are more likely than 
other children at the same socioeconomic level to engage in criminal activity.  Kennedy, 
supra, at 93.  Further, children of incarcerated parents are also “more likely to engage in 
drug use, early sexual activity, and truancy” compared to children whose parents are not 
incarcerated.  Id.  Kennedy further notes that although these consequences may be due in 
part to the loss of the incarcerated parent, the issues experienced by the children could also 
be attributed to the child’s placement in foster care.  Id. 
50 See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 838 (“[C]hildren are ‘innocents,’ and as such do not 
deserve to be punished for the ‘sins’ of their parents.”); Alderman, supra note 46, at 294–96 
(discussing the harm to the family caused by an individual’s incarceration); Brooks & 
Bahna, supra note 46, at 277–84 (discussing harm to the family when one of its members is 
incarcerated); Bush, supra note 46, at 194–98 (discussing the harm to a defendant’s children 
upon incarceration); Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81 (discussing the harm of 
incarceration to the family).  In addition to family harm, critics also focus on the general 
harm to society stemming from incarceration.  Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 284–85; 
Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81.  According to Brooks & Bahna, society bears the cost of 
incarceration because children of inmates are more likely to engage in criminal activity.  
Brooks & Bahan, supra note 46, at 284.  Further, society must bear the financial cost of 
supporting the inmate’s children or spouse through the public welfare system.  Id.; see 
SCHIRMER ET AL., supra note 48, at 9 (discussing the risk that inmates will lose their parental 
rights due to incarceration).  Finally, society bears the cost of incarceration due to the high 
rate of recidivism among parent offenders.  Brooks & Bahna, supra note 46, at 285.  
Ellingstad similarly recognizes that society bears the cost of foster care, permanent family 
dissolution where the court terminates a parent offender’s parental rights, and dependence 
on government aid where the family’s primary financial source is incarcerated.  Ellingstad, 
supra note 46, at 981.  In light of these costs, Ellingstad argues that courts should weigh the 
cost of incarceration against the benefit of incarceration when determining whether to 
depart based on family ties.  Id. at 980–81. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/6
2013] A Continuing Conundrum 229 
appropriate sentence.51  Such consideration provides sentencing judges 
with discretion to consider the defendant’s family in light of the 
additional harm that incarceration may inflict on society, the family, and 
the defendant himself.52  However, such a system inherently creates an 
opportunity for the imposition of a lesser sentence, potential unfairness, 
and abuse of such system by parents because the likelihood of deterrence 
has been reduced.53  Sentencing judges often recognize the tension 
                                                 
51 See infra Part II.C (discussing downward departures from the Guidelines based on the 
defendant’s family ties and responsibilities); see also infra note 57 (providing the text of 
Guidelines section 5H1.6 addressing departures based on family ties and responsibilities). 
52 See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 835–40 (detailing arguments in favor of family 
consideration in sentencing due to the additional harms inflicted on the defendant’s family 
and the defendant himself); Bush, supra note 46, at 195 (providing the principles driving 
consideration of the defendant’s children at sentencing); Raeder, supra note 11, at 698–704 
(advocating for judicial focus on the effect of incarceration to the family).  Bush argues that 
the purposes of the criminal justice system, including deterrence, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation, support consideration of the defendant’s children at sentencing because the 
judge must weigh the cost of the sentence against its social benefit in achieving those goals.  
Bush, supra note 46, at 194.  Bush further claims that the SRA condones consideration of the 
defendant’s family at sentencing.  Id. at 195.  Finally, Bush claims that consideration of the 
defendant’s family would promote consistency in sentencing and would effectuate the least 
punitive sentence required under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id. at 194–95; see infra note 93 
(providing the text of the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)).  In Bush’s 
view, a parent’s sentence of incarceration is not equal to that of a non-parent because of the 
impact that sentence will have on the inmate’s children.  Bush, supra note 46, at 194.  
Further, because parental incarceration would inflict additional punishment compared to 
nonparent inmates, § 3553(a) requires the court to consider family circumstances so that the 
punishment is no greater than necessary.  Id. at 195. 
53 See Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 840–42 (presenting arguments against considering 
the interests of the defendant’s children in sentencing); Douglas A. Berman, Addressing 
Why:  Developing Principled Rationales for Family-Based Departures, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 274, 
274 (2001) (“[I]t is difficult to provide a principled explanation for exactly why a criminal 
offender should merit a lesser punishment simply because he or she has a spouse or 
children or other relatives.”).  Abramowicz also recognizes arguments that claim there is 
nothing inherently unfair in failing to consider a defendant’s family at sentencing because 
the defendant could easily have avoided or foreseen those detrimental consequences to his 
or her family.  Abramowicz, supra note 46, at 841.  In line with this argument, skeptics 
further argue that taking a defendant’s family into consideration during sentencing fails to 
deter parents from engaging in criminal activity and may actually encourage such activity.  
Id.  Finally, critics argue that this standard would undermine the entire legitimacy of 
criminal law by immunizing parents from penal consequences.  Id. at 842; see, e.g., United 
States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the female 
defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was the sole 
caregiver for two young children and also assisted her nineteen-year-old son with college 
expenses and health insurance); United States v. Dyce, 975 F. Supp. 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1997) 
(holding that the female defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the 
defendant was the sole caretaker of her three children); see also United States v. Cage, 451 
F.3d 585, 596 (10th Cir. 2006) (reasoning that to consider the effects of a single mother’s 
incarceration on her children “would effectively immunize single mothers from criminal 
sanction aside from supervised release”); United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 
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between addressing the effect of the defendant’s incarceration on family 
ties and ensuring that the defendant does not receive a lesser sentence 
based on the mere presence of those family ties.54  Any system that 
allows significant judicial discretion creates an inherent lack of 
uniformity and requires a consistent and well-informed departure 
standard for courts to effectively strike a balance in sentencing 
decisions.55  
C. Downward Departures Based on Family Ties and Responsibilities  
Guidelines section 5H1.6 provides for sentencing departures based 
on a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities.56  Family ties, however, 
are considered a discouraged factor in determining whether the 
circumstances warrant a downward departure.57  In Koon v. United States, 
the Supreme Court first established the standard by which district courts 
should analyze whether a discouraged factor would warrant departure 
in any given case.58  The standard was widely criticized as being 
                                                                                                             
2002) (“[S]ingle mother status is not an ‘idiosyncratic’ circumstance, distinguishing her case 
from the ‘mine-run.’” (quoting United States v. ChestnaChestna, 962 962 F.2d 103, 107103, 
107 (1st Cir. 1992))); United States v. Patterson, 17 F. App’x 496, 497 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding 
that the defendant’s status as a single mother of an infant was not extraordinary enough to 
remove the case from the “heartland” of the applicable guideline); United States v. Brand, 
907 F.2d 31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s society, 
and imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the children.”). 
54 Compare United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577, at 
*6 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“The Court believes that the focus of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 is on the 
loss of caretaking and financial support for the defendant’s family that a defendant’s 
incarceration would cause.”), with United States v. Justice, No. CR 09 3078 JB, 2012 WL 
394455, at *11 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012) (“Many defendants whom the Court sentences to a 
term of imprisonment have young children. . . .  This pattern is a common one that appears 
before the Court.”), and United States v. Tilga, No. CR 09 0865 JB, 2012 WL 1192526, at *3 
(D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012) (“[T]he court sees many defendants with children, and . . . must put 
these circumstances into context. . . . Children often suffer from the choices their parents 
make . . . .”). 
55 See infra Part IV (providing recommended amendments to the Guidelines to reflect a 
uniform standard for family ties and departures that would include objective factors). 
56 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012). 
57 Id.  The relevant policy statement provides:  “[i]n sentencing a defendant . . . family 
ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure 
may be warranted.”  Id. 
58 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95–96 (1996).  The Court stated that in considering 
discouraged factors, courts could depart on this basis where “the factor is present to an 
exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case different from the ordinary case 
where the factor is present.”  Id. at 96.  The Court also clarified that where the factor is 
forbidden courts may not consider that factor in sentencing.  Id. at 95–96.  Further the Court 
directed judges to consider encouraged factors in sentencing where such factor is not 
already taken into account by the applicable guideline.  Id. at 96.  Finally, the Court stated 
that “‘after considering the structure and theory of both relevant individual guidelines and 
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unworkable and vague, resulting in differing interpretations among the 
federal courts when applying it.59  Although the Guidelines have since 
undergone amendments, namely the Feeney Amendment pursuant to 
the PROTECT Act and the now advisory role of the Guidelines under the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Booker, district courts have maintained a 
similar family ties departure standard.60    
Part II.C.1 first provides the general departure standard handed 
down by the Supreme Court in Koon and looks to the way in which 
district courts interpreted that standard in the realm of family ties 
departures.61  Part II.C.2 then provides an overview of the amendments 
to the Guidelines pursuant to the PROTECT Act and the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Booker.62  Finally, Part II.C.2 also looks to the way in 
which these amendments have affected district courts’ family ties 
departure analysis.63 
1. The Guidelines Departure Standard Under Koon 
In Koon, the Supreme Court suggested a multi-step analysis to guide 
district courts in determining whether a departure from the applicable 
sentencing guideline is warranted.64  According to Koon, the sentencing 
judge should first consider whether unusual factual circumstances exist 
                                                                                                             
the Guidelines taken as a whole,’” courts must decide whether an unmentioned factor 
sufficiently takes the case out of the heartland.  Id. (quoting United States v. Rivera, 994 
F.2d 942, 949 (1st Cir. 1993)). 
59 See, e.g., Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 73–74 (attributing the circuit split 
regarding family ties and responsibility departures to the vague heartland concept 
provided in Koon); Shoenberg, supra note 11, at 294 (describing the distinction in Koon 
between “ordinary” and “extraordinary” as a “mission impossible” (internal quotation 
marks omitted)). 
60 See United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 245 (2005) (holding that the Guidelines, as 
amended, are now effectively advisory); see also infra note 87 and accompanying text 
(providing the text of the amendments to 2003 Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the 
2003 PROTECT Act). 
61 See infra Part II.C.1 (providing the Supreme Court’s analysis in Koon as well as the 
district courts’ departure standards following that decision). 
62 See infra Part II.C.2 (providing an overview of amendments made to the Guidelines 
pursuant to the PROTECT Act and Booker). 
63 See infra Part II.C.2 (providing examples of family ties departure standards among the 
district courts following amendment to the Guidelines). 
64 Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 95–96 (1996).  The Supreme Court in Koon also 
explained that the proper standard of review for departure decisions was abuse of 
discretion.  Id. at 100.  The Court reasoned that “[a] district court’s decision to depart from 
the Guidelines . . . will in most cases be due substantial deference, for it embodies the 
traditional exercise of discretion by a sentencing court.”  Id. at 98.  Behind its rationale, the 
Court noted that “[d]istrict courts have an institutional advantage over appellate courts in 
making these sorts of determinations, especially as they see so many more Guidelines cases 
than appellate courts do.”  Id. 
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in a given case, so as to take it out of the “heartland” of typical cases.65  If 
the circumstances render the case atypical, the sentencing court should 
then consider whether the Commission forbids, encourages, or 
discourages departures on the basis of the factors presented.66  The Court 
further explained that the sentencing judge should not grant a departure 
if the circumstances fall within one of the Commission’s prohibited 
categories.67  However, a sentencing court may depart on the basis of 
encouraged factors if those circumstances have not already been 
adequately taken into account in formulating the applicable guideline.68  
Finally, a sentencing court may depart on the basis of discouraged 
factors when the factual circumstances separate the case from typical 
cases involving that factor or when the discouraged factor is present to 
an “exceptional degree.”69  
The Commission has never considered a criminal defendant’s family 
ties as a relevant offender characteristic for the purposes of sentencing.70  
                                                 
65 Id. at 95.  The Koon Court recommended district courts compare the present case to 
other similar Guidelines cases when determining whether the circumstances are sufficient 
to remove it from the “heartland.”  Id. at 98. 
66 Id.; see supra notes 42–44 and accompanying text (discussing departures based on 
prohibited, encouraged, and discouraged factors).  Despite the Court’s instructions in Koon, 
district courts developed different standards of analysis for determining departures.  See, 
e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295–96 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (considering first 
whether the court possesses the power to depart based on the defendant’s family 
circumstances, then, whether the court should exercise its discretion to depart by balancing 
the defendant’s family circumstances against statutory concerns, and finally, to what extent 
the court should depart in light of policy considerations); United States v. Colp, 249 F. 
Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2003) (setting forth an expounded version of the Koon analysis); 
United States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (considering first the 
defendant’s family circumstances, then whether a departure from the applicable guideline 
would spare unnecessary family hardship, and finally the purposes of sentencing). 
67 Koon, 518 U.S. at 95–96; see supra note 42 (listing those factors the Commission 
prohibits for sentencing consideration). 
68 Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; see supra note 43 (listing factors the Commission encourages for 
sentencing consideration). 
69 Koon, 518 U.S. at 96; see supra note 44 (listing factors the Commission discourages for 
sentencing consideration).  The Court informed district courts to apply the same standard 
to cases in which encouraged factors, those already taken into account by the applicable 
guideline, removed the case from the norm.  Koon, 518 U.S. at 96.  The Court further 
advised courts that when an unmentioned factor is present in the facts of a case, the 
sentencing court should decide whether or not it removes the case from the heartland so 
that a departure is warranted.  Id.  According to the Court, sentencing courts should 
consider the purpose behind the Guidelines as well as the Commission’s expectation that 
unmentioned factors will very rarely warrant departure when making this determination.  
Id. 
70 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (“In sentencing 
a defendant . . . family ties and responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a departure may be warranted.”).  In the first Guidelines manual, the Commission 
similarly provided that “[f]amily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in 
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Thus, under the Koon analysis, family ties are a discouraged sentencing 
factor.71  In applying the Koon standard, the district court must find that 
family circumstances are extraordinary enough to remove the case from 
the “heartland” of cases encompassed by the applicable sentencing 
range, thus permitting a downward departure.72  However, despite the 
SRA’s goal of increased sentencing uniformity, drawing the line between 
ordinary and extraordinary under the Koon standard proved difficult.73  
                                                                                                             
determining whether a sentence should be outside the guidelines.”  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (1987).  This language was slightly changed 
in the 1991 manual, although its categorization of family ties departures as discouraged 
remained the same.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement 
(1991) (“Family ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
whether a sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.”).  In 2005, the 
Commission adopted language in the family ties and responsibilities policy statement that 
is currently used in today’s Guidelines manual.  See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
§ 5H1.6 policy statement (2005) (“In sentencing a defendant . . . family ties and 
responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a departure may be 
warranted.”). 
71 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2012) (providing 
that family ties and responsibilities are not “ordinarily relevant” in determining downward 
departures from the Guidelines); see also United States v. Carrasco, 271 F.3d 765, 768 (8th 
Cir. 2001) (“Family responsibility is generally a disfavored reason for granting a 
departure.”).  Prior to the amendment discussed in the preceding footnote, the standard for 
departures based on a defendant’s family ties under the Guidelines provided that, 
“[f]amily ties and responsibilities . . . are not ordinarily relevant in determining whether a 
sentence should be outside the applicable guideline range.” U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2000); see supra note 44 and accompanying text 
(categorizing a defendant’s family ties and responsibilities as a discouraged factor under 
the Guidelines).  For a discussion of amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 made 
pursuant to the PROTECT Act, see infra Part II.C.2. 
72 Compare United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that only 
atypical cases falling outside of the “heartland” of cases encompassed in the applicable 
guideline warrant a downward departure), with United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 
289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (explaining that a district court has discretion to depart when the 
defendant’s family circumstances are “extraordinary”).  The Court’s “heartland” departure 
standard in Koon has received criticism for its lack of guidance and definitiveness.  See 
Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 79–88 (discussing the issues apparent in departures 
since Koon); Shoenberg, supra note 11, at 294–95 (criticizing the problematic expectation that 
courts differentiate between the ordinary and the extraordinary in determining whether a 
family ties and responsibilities departure is warranted).  
73 See Goldmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 74–78 (discussing differing court 
interpretations of “ordinary” family circumstances under Koon).  Goldsmith & Porter 
identify three categories of sentencing court standards for family ties departures after Koon.  
Id.  The first category of family ties departures involve cases in which the defendant is a 
single parent who typically lacks the availability of other family members or suitable 
caretakers.  Id. at 75.  The second category includes those defendants in a two-parent 
household.  Id. at 75–76.  Goldsmith & Porter note that departures within the second 
category vary widely and unpredictably as they are analyzed under a very fact specific 
inquiry.  Id at 76.  Finally, the third category includes those defendants who care for third 
parties other than their children, such as a spouse, parent, or sibling.  Id. at 77. 
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Several differing standards for “extraordinary” family circumstances 
arose among and within the federal circuits following the Court’s 
decision.74    
The Third Circuit adopted a fairly broad family ties departure 
standard by requiring that sentencing judges find the defendant’s family 
circumstances take the case out of the ordinary.75  The Fourth Circuit, on 
the other hand, set forth a more narrow family ties departure standard.76  
For instance, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia 
determined that a family’s significant economic hardship upon a 
defendant’s imprisonment, standing alone, as well as a family member’s 
illness, standing alone, are not sufficient to warrant a departure based on 
“extraordinary” family circumstances.77  Accordingly, the Fourth 
Circuit’s narrow departure standard for extraordinary family ties under 
Koon required the combined presence of serious medical and financial 
family circumstances to render the defendant’s family responsibilities 
“unique.”78  
                                                 
74 See infra notes 75–84 and accompanying text (discussing the different family ties 
departures standards among district courts following Koon).  Another critic identified three 
basic standards under which departures based on family ties fell after the Koon decision.  
Farrell, supra note 11, at 271–72.  Under the first standard, Farrell notes that a district court 
simply considers whether the family circumstance is “extraordinary.”  Id. at 271.  Under the 
second category, the district court considers whether the impact of the defendant’s 
incarceration within the applicable guideline on his or her family is exceptional.  Id. at 271–
72.  Finally, under the third category, Farrell notes that district courts utilize a more lax 
standard in considering whether the family circumstance is “substantial.”  Id. at 272; see 
supra note 31 (providing a brief overview of the SRA’s objectives, including increased 
sentencing uniformity in response to wide sentencing disparities). 
75 See United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term 
‘extraordinary’ . . . retains its literal meaning:  the circumstances of the case must simply 
place it outside the ordinary.”).  The court further explained that departures based on 
family ties and responsibilities do not require circumstances that are “extra-ordinary by any 
particular degree of magnitude.”  Id.  The court slightly limited its standard by further 
providing that family ties departures may not be granted on the basis of “generic concerns 
regarding breaking up families.”  Id. at 196–97.   
76 See United States v. Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d 740, 742 (E.D. Va. 2003) (“The Fourth Circuit 
has narrowly construed downward departures based on family ties.”); United States v. 
Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d 716, 721 (E.D. Va. 2002) (“The Fourth Circuit has narrowly construed 
downward departures based on family ties.”). 
77 Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 742; Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 721.  
78 See Velez, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 723 (finding that a combination of “life-threatening illness 
and economic hardship” constitutes “exceptional” family circumstances).  In Velez, the 
defendant requested a family ties departure because of his position as the sole financial 
provider for his wife and four children.  Id. at 720.  The defendant’s wife became 
unemployed after she developed clinical depression and post-traumatic stress disorder 
following the tragic death of their ten-month old child, and she was also diagnosed with 
cervical cancer, which required extensive treatment.  Id.  The court held that the departure 
was warranted because the combination of family financial hardship and serious medical 
issues constituted “unique” family circumstances justifying departure.  Id. at 722; see also 
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In the Second Circuit, various grounds arose for determining 
whether a defendant’s family circumstances are sufficiently 
extraordinary to warrant departure.79  For example, the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York broadly categorized 
“extraordinary” family circumstances as those that would bring 
“exceptional hardship” to the family upon the defendant’s incarceration 
under the Guidelines.80  However, the same court later construed these 
circumstances more narrowly by permitting departure where minor 
dependents uniquely rely on the defendant’s continuous financial and 
emotional support.81 
Differing grounds for family ties departures also arose within the 
Seventh Circuit.82  The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of 
                                                                                                             
Colp, 249 F. Supp. 2d at 743–45 (granting a family ties departure where the defendant was 
the sole caretaker and provider for her disabled husband who required constant care due 
to his limited mental and physical capabilities after surviving a severe automobile 
accident). 
79 See, e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Family 
circumstances are extraordinary when exceptional hardship to a defendant’s family would 
result from a sentence within the Guidelines range.”); United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 
2d 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (providing that family circumstances are sufficiently 
exceptional only when the defendant’s family is “’uniquely dependant [sic]’” on the 
continuation of the defendant’s financial and emotional responsibilities (quoting United 
States v. Sprei, 145 F.3d 528, 535 (2d Cir. 1998))); United States v. Ayala, 75 F. Supp. 2d 126, 
137 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) (providing that family circumstances warrant departure when the 
defendant provides a “unique source of financial and/or emotional support for a significant 
number of dependents”(emphasis added)). 
80 White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 294; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (providing the 
standard for extraordinary family circumstances in White); see also United States v. Johnson, 
964 F.2d 124, 129 (2d Cir. 1992) (“Nor do we find any reason to believe that family 
circumstances warranting departure must include something beyond extraordinary 
parental responsibilities.”).  In explaining its family ties departures standard, the court in 
White explained that some family hardship resulting from a defendant’s imprisonment is 
inherent and therefore is not out of the ordinary.  White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 294.  In White, 
the defendant was a single mother of five children, ages five to thirteen, and had legal 
custody of her fourteen-year-old sister.  Id. at 291.  The court granted the defendant’s 
motion to depart based on family ties, finding that the loss of six children to the state foster 
care system would bring about extraordinary hardship to the family.  Id. at 295–96. 
81 Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221; see supra note 79 and accompanying text (providing the 
standard for extraordinary family circumstances set forth in Robles).  In Robles, the 
defendant provided “significant care” for his father, who had undergone two open-heart 
surgeries, wore a pacemaker, and suffered from seizures.  Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 220–21.  
The court held that the defendant’s family circumstances did not warrant departure 
because the defendant’s father, rather than minor dependents, would be affected 
negatively by the defendant’s imprisonment.  Id. at 221. 
82 See United States v. Owens, 145 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 1998) (analyzing whether the 
defendant’s family circumstances were sufficiently atypical to remove the case from the 
heartland); United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding that 
“the defendant must show that the harm to his children will be greater than in the typical 
case” to warrant departure (emphasis added)); United States v. Savulescu, No. 95 CR 511-2, 
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Wisconsin framed its standard for “extraordinary” family circumstances 
around the effect of a defendant’s incarceration on his or her children.83  
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, on the other 
hand, more broadly considered the effect of a defendant’s sentence on 
general family members under its “extraordinary” family circumstances 
standard.84  In addition to district courts’ interpretations under Koon, the 
PROTECT Act and the Supreme Court’s decision in Booker provided 
further context for interpretations of family ties departures under the 
newly advisory Guidelines.85 
2. The PROTECT Act and the Advisory Sentencing Guidelines 
Congress, in conjunction with the PROTECT Act of 2003, passed the 
Feeney Amendment in an effort to curtail departures and prevent 
sentencing judges from circumventing the Guidelines.86  As a result, 
                                                                                                             
2002 WL 745787, at *1 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (“In making a finding of extraordinary family 
circumstances, the court must find that ‘the period of incarceration set by the Guidelines 
would have an effect on the family or family members beyond the disruption to family and 
parental relationships that would be present in the usual case.’” (emphasis added) (quoting 
United States v. Canoy, 38 F.3d 893, 907 (7th Cir. 1994))). 
83 Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing the 
standard for family ties and responsibilities departures in Maas).  In Maas, the defendant 
was convicted of “transferring a firearm to a felon” and “transporting in interstate 
commerce wildlife taken in violation of state law.”  Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 953–54.  At 
sentencing, the defendant asked for a downward departure on the basis of family ties.  Id. 
at 960.  The court held that the defendant’s family circumstances were not sufficiently 
unusual to justify a downward departure.  Id. at 961.  The court reasoned that the 
defendant’s Guidelines sentence would not negatively impact his children to a significant 
degree because the defendant’s wife was still available to parent and financially support 
the children during the defendant’s incarceration.  Id.; see United States v. Pearson, 282 F. 
Supp. 2d 941, 943 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (“[When] confronted with a motion based on family 
circumstances . . . the court should consider whether the guideline range is such that a 
reasonable departure will spare the defendant’s family from unnecessary hardship.”). 
84 Savulescu, 2002 WL 745787, at *1; see supra note 82 and accompanying text (providing 
the standard for family ties and responsibilities departures in Savulescu).  In Savulescu, the 
defendant moved for a family ties departure as the sole caretaker and source of financial 
support for his wife, who suffered from severe and chronic bipolar disorder.  Savulescu, 
2002 WL 745787, at *1, *3.  The court held that the defendant’s circumstances warranted a 
departure because his wife’s mental illness prevented her from caring for herself medically 
and financially.  Id. at *3.  The court further reasoned that the defendant’s wife would lose 
the benefit of the defendant’s insurance, which covered her medical costs, and that no one 
else was available to care for his wife upon the defendant’s incarceration.  Id. 
85 See infra Part II.C.2 (explaining the impact of the PROTECT Act and Booker on the 
Guidelines and district courts’ interpretations of family ties departures thereafter). 
86 Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today 
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (codified as amended in scattered 
sections of 18 U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C.); Becky Gregory & Traci Kenner, A New Era in Federal 
Sentencing, 68 TEX. B.J. 796, 798 (2005).  Most notably, the PROTECT Act changed the 
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Guidelines section 5H1.6 regarding family ties departures underwent 
amendment.87  Pursuant to the PROTECT Act, the Commission included 
                                                                                                             
standard of review for departure decisions from the Koon abuse of discretion standard to a 
de novo standard.  Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of 
Children Today (PROTECT) Act § 401(d)(2) (“[T]he court of appeals shall review de novo 
the district court’s application of the guidelines to the facts.”).  The Guidelines also note 
that “[t]he PROTECT Act . . . directs the Commission, not later than 180 days after the 
enactment of the Act, to promulgate . . . appropriate amendments to the sentencing 
guidelines, policy statements, and official commentary to ensure that the incidence of 
downward departures is substantially reduced.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 
app. C, vol. II, amend. 651 (2003). 
87 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 policy statement (2003) (noting that 
“Section 401(b)(4) of Public Law 108-21 (the “Protect Act”) directly amended Section 5H1.6 
to add the [commentary], effective April 30, 2003”).  The amendment added an application 
note that reads: 
1. Circumstances to Consider.— 
(A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is 
warranted under this policy statement, the court shall 
consider the following non-exhaustive list of circumstances: 
(i) The seriousness of the offense. 
(ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of 
members of the defendant’s family. 
(iii) The danger, if any, to members of the 
defendant’s family as a result of the offense. 
(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial 
Support.—A departure under this policy statement based on 
loss of caretaking or financial support of the defendant’s 
family requires, in addition to the court’s consideration of 
the non-exhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A), 
the presence of the following circumstances: 
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within 
the applicable guideline range will cause a 
substantial, direct, and specific loss of 
essential caretaking, or essential financial 
support, to the defendant’s family. 
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support 
substantially exceeds the harm ordinarily 
incident to incarceration for a similarly 
situated defendant. . . . 
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is 
one for which no effective remedial or 
ameliorative programs reasonably are 
available, making the defendant’s caretaking 
or financial support irreplaceable to the 
defendant’s family. 
(iv) The departure effectively will address the 
loss of caretaking or financial support. 
Id.  The Guidelines note that the addition of these criteria imposes a duty on courts to 
“conduct certain more rigorous analyses.”  Id. at app. C, vol. II, amend. 651.  The 
Guidelines further note that the addition of factors pertaining to departures based on loss 
Boatman: A Continuing Conundrum:  Applying Consistent Gender-Neutral Crite
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2013
238 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 48 
an application note for sentencing courts determining family ties 
departures in order to guide judges.88  According to the amendment, 
judges are to consider the seriousness of the offense at hand, the 
involvement of any of the defendant’s family members in the offense, 
and any danger to the defendant’s immediate family members as a result 
of the offense when determining whether departure is warranted.89  The 
application note also restricts family ties departures based specifically on 
loss of caretaking and financial support to situations involving four 
circumstances:  (1) a sentence within the applicable guideline range will 
cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of essential caretaking or 
essential financial support to the defendant’s family; (2) such loss 
exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration; (3) the defendant’s 
caretaking or financial support is irreplaceable to his or her family 
because remedial or ameliorative programs are not reasonably available; 
and (4) the departure would effectively address the loss.90  Although the 
amended commentary provides more guidance to sentencing judges 
applying section 5H1.6, the commentary does not restrict courts’ analysis 
to these factors in every case.91  
The Guidelines underwent further change pursuant to the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Booker, where the Court directed federal judges to 
consider the Guidelines as advisory, rather than mandatory, when 
determining a criminal defendant’s sentence.92  In the wake of Booker, 
                                                                                                             
of caretaking or financial support establishes “heightened criteria” for family ties 
departures.  Id. 
88 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines 
section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). 
89 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 4(b) (2012) 
(“The Commission intends the sentencing courts to treat each guideline as carving out a 
‘heartland,’ a set of typical cases embodying the conduct that each guidelines describes.”); 
supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines section 
5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). 
90 See supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines 
section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).  The Guidelines further note that “[t]he 
Commission believes that these general policy changes, working together, will 
substantially reduce the incidence of downward departures.”  U.S. SENTENCING 
GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol. II, amend. 651 (2003).  
91 E.g., United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *1 (D. Conn. 
July 31, 2006).  In Davis, the court noted that a defendant’s family circumstances must be 
“exceptional” to warrant departure, but in the event that the defendant argues specifically 
for departure based on “loss of caretaking or financial support” the court should look to 
the additional factors in Guidelines section 5H1.6 added pursuant to the PROTECT Act.  
Id.; see supra note 87 and accompanying text (providing the amendments to Guidelines 
section 5H1.6). 
92 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220, 259–65 (2005).  The Court in Booker held that the 
sentencing statute provision mandating district court judges to sentence within the 
applicable range was unconstitutional.  See id. at 245 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 3553(b)(1) 
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district courts faced confusion in attempting to utilize the “effectively 
advisory” Guidelines in sentencing determinations.93  However, 
                                                                                                             
incompatible with the Sixth Amendment’s requirement that juries find facts relevant to 
sentencing rather than judges).  The Court also invalidated the sentencing statute provision 
that provided the de novo appellate standard of review and replaced it with the 
“reasonableness” standard.  See id. at 259, 261 (finding 18 U.S.C. § 3742(e) incompatible 
with the Sixth Amendment).  Justice Breyer, writing for the majority of the court in part, 
explained that the Guidelines, as amended to sever and excise these provisions, are 
advisory in nature and instructed district judges to consider the applicable sentencing 
range while “tailor[ing] the sentence in light of other statutory concerns.”  Id. at 245.  Such 
concerns include the need for the sentence to “reflect the seriousness of the offense, 
promote respect for the law, provide just punishment, afford adequate deterrence, protect 
the public, and effectively provide the defendant with needed educational or vocational 
training and medical care.”  Id. at 245, 260.  Although the Guidelines are advisory for 
federal courts, sentences falling well outside of the applicable range are not afforded a 
presumption of reasonableness.  United States v. Vigil, 476 F. Supp. 2d 1231, 1266 (D.N.M. 
2007). 
93 See Paul J. Hofer, Beyond the “Heartland”:  Sentencing Under the Advisory Federal 
Guidelines, 49 DUQ. L. REV. 675, 687–94 (2011) (discussing courts’ reaction to the advisory 
Guidelines post-Booker).  The Court’s decision in Booker placed emphasis on 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553 as providing the central framework for federal sentencing under the advisory 
Guidelines.  Id. at 688.  In pertinent part, 18 U.S.C. § 3553 provides: 
(a) FACTORS TO BE CONSIDERED IN IMPOSING A SENTENCE.—The court 
shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary. . . . The court, in determining the particular sentence to 
be imposed, shall consider— 
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history 
and characteristics of the defendant; 
(2) the need for the sentence imposed— 
(A) to reflect the seriousness of the offense, to promote 
respect for the law, and to provide just punishment for 
the offense; 
(B) to afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct; 
(C) to protect the public from further crimes of 
the defendant; and 
(D) to provide the defendant with the needed educational 
or vocational training, medical care, or other 
correctional treatment in the most effective manner; 
(3) the kinds of sentences available; 
(4) the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range 
established for— 
(A) the applicable category of offense committed by the 
applicable category of defendant as set forth in the 
guidelines . . . 
(5) any pertinent policy statement— 
(A) issued by the Sentencing Commission . . . 
(6) the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities among 
defendants with similar records who have been found guilty 
of similar conduct; and 
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subsequent Supreme Court decisions helped to clarify the role of the 
Guidelines in sentencing post-Booker.94  In light of these decisions, the 
                                                                                                             
(7) the need to provide restitution to any victims of 
the offense. 
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006).  However, the Commission proposed that the fourth statutory 
factor, “‘the kinds of sentence and the sentencing range’” established under Guidelines, be 
the first step in determining sentences post-Booker.  Hofer, supra, at 688.  The Commission 
argued that the Guidelines were already developed to comply with § 3553(a) and thus, the 
Guidelines deserved “substantial weight” in application.  Id. at 689.  In practice, many 
district courts took this approach.  Id. at 688; see Frank O. Bowman, III, The Year of 
Jubilee . . . Or Maybe Not:  Some Preliminary Observations About the Operation of the Federal 
Sentencing System After Booker, 43 HOUS. L. REV. 279, 290–94 (2006) (providing that some 
courts recognized that Booker did not abolish the Guidelines nor did it make the Guidelines 
voluntary); Susan R. Klein, The Return of Federal Judicial Discretion in Criminal Sentencing, 39 
VAL. U. L. REV. 693, 719–34 (2005) (predicting Booker‘s effects on federal sentencing); 
Graham C. Mullen & J.P. Davis, Mandatory Guidelines:  The Oxymoronic State of Sentencing 
After United States v. Booker, 41 U. RICH. L. REV. 625, 631–37 (2007) (explaining the trend in 
circuits post-Booker to continue to regard Guidelines sentences as presumptively 
reasonable); Lee D. Heckman, Note, The Benefits of Departure Obsolescence:  Achieving the 
Purposes of Sentencing in the Post-Booker World, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 149, 171–76 (2008) 
(recognizing that a majority of circuits continued to calculate Guideline sentencing ranges 
post-Booker); Sarah Millard, Survey, The Effect of Booker on Federal Sentence Modification 
Proceedings:  How the Tenth Circuit Got it Right in Rhodes, 87 DENV. U. L. REV. 771, 771 (2010) 
(arguing for the preservation of the mandatory Guidelines in modification actions). 
94 See generally Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338 (2007) (expounding on the advisory 
role of the Guidelines); Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007) (expounding on the 
advisory role of the Guidelines); Kimbrough v. United States, 552 U.S. 85 (2007) 
(expounding on the advisory role of the Guidelines).  In Gall, the Supreme Court adopted a 
“guidelines-first” approach and instructed district courts to “begin all sentencing 
proceedings by correctly calculating the applicable Guidelines range.  As a matter of 
administration and to secure nationwide consistency, the Guidelines should be the starting 
point and the initial benchmark.”  Gall, 552 U.S. at 49 (citation omitted); Hofer, supra note 
93, at 688.  Further, in Rita, the Court provided that appellate courts could presume 
sentences within the applicable Guidelines range to be reasonable, but did not hold them to 
this standard.  Id. at 691.  The Court in Rita noted that an assumption of reasonableness is 
warranted because: 
The Guidelines as written reflect the fact that the Sentencing 
Commission examined tens of thousands of sentences and worked 
with the help of many others in the law enforcement community over 
a long period of time. . . . [I]t is fair to assume that the Guidelines, 
insofar as practicable, reflect a rough approximation of sentences that 
might achieve § 3553(a)’s objectives. 
Rita, 551 U.S. at 349–50.  However, in Kimbrough, the Court acknowledged that some 
sentencing guidelines “do not exemplify the Commission’s exercise of its characteristic 
institutional role.”  Kimbrough, 552 U.S. at 109; Hofer, supra note 93, at 691.  For example, 
the Commission departed from its empirical research approach in determining sentencing 
guidelines for drug offenses and instead looked to statutory mandatory minimum 
sentences established by Congress.  Id. at 692.  In these instances, where the applicable 
guideline is not the product of empirical research, the Court provided that it is not an abuse 
of discretion for district courts to conclude that the guideline fails to achieve the sentencing 
purposes set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id. 
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Commission amended section 1B.1, which provides “Application 
Instructions,” to reflect a three-step approach used in determining a 
defendant’s sentence.95  Under this approach, district courts should first 
calculate the applicable Guideline range, then consider policy statements 
and official commentary to determine whether departure is warranted, 
and finally should consider the statutory sentencing factors enumerated 
in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) to determine whether a variance from the 
Guidelines is warranted.96  
Following these amendments to the Guidelines, district courts have 
continued to maintain differing family ties departure standards across 
the circuits by utilizing the “extraordinary” standard set forth in Koon.97  
                                                 
95 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B.1 (2012) (providing a three-step 
approach to determining a defendant’s sentence under the Guidleines).  The Application 
Instruction, effective November 1, 2010 provides: 
(a) The court shall determine the kinds of sentence and the guideline 
range as set forth in the guidelines . . . 
(b) The court shall then consider Parts H and K of Chapter Five, 
Specific Offender Characteristics and Departures, and any other 
policy statements or commentary in the guidelines that might 
warrant consideration in imposing sentence. . . . 
(c) The court shall then consider the applicable factors in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a) taken as a whole. . . . 
Id.  The Commission also added background commentary stating that, “[i]f, after step (c), 
the court imposes a sentence that is outside the guidelines framework, such a sentence is 
considered a ‘variance’.”  Id. § 1B.1 cmt. background; Hofer, supra note 93, at 697.  In an 
explanatory note, the Commission explained that “‘[d]eparture’ is a term of art under the 
Guidelines and refers only to non-Guidelines sentences imposed under the framework set 
out in the Guidelines” and that “[a] ‘variance’—i.e., a sentence outside the guideline range 
other than as provided for in the Guidelines Manual—is considered by the court only after 
departures have been considered.”  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol. 
III, amend. 741 (2012) (quoting, in part, Izizarry v. United States, 128 S.Ct. 2198, 2202 
(2008)); see, e.g., United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09 3078 JB, 2011 WL 6828055, at *4 
(D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (“A district court may also rely on the existence of family ties and 
responsibilities in varying downward on a defendant’s sentence.”).  In adopting this 
framework, the Commission also acted in accordance with a majority of circuits in regards 
to the three-step approach.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at app. C, vol. III, 
amend. 741 (2012). 
96 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 1B.1 (2012); see supra note 95 and 
accompanying text (providing the three-step application instructions under the amended 
Guidelines); see also supra note 93 (providing the text of 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)). 
97 See supra note 69 and accompanying text (providing the “extraordinary” standard in 
Koon); see also United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL 4813279, at 
*1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (“[A] reduction in a defendant's sentence based on family ties and 
responsibilities is discouraged, absent a finding that ‘the defendant's family ties or 
responsibilities are extraordinary.’”(quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 434 (4th 
Cir. 1997))); United States v. Gonzelez-Lopez, No. CR 11 3002 JB, 2012 WL 3150350, at *11 
(D.N.M. July 27, 2012) (“[U]nusual circumstances may be sufficiently extraordinary that 
they are accepted as a basis for departure . . . .”); United States v. Tilga, No. CR 09 0865 JB, 
2012 WL 1192526, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 5, 2012) (holding that the defendant’s family 
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In the Tenth Circuit, certain district courts have maintained a fairly 
broad family ties departure standard by requiring that the defendant’s 
family circumstances fall outside of the ordinary spectrum of cases.98  On 
the other hand, the Eighth Circuit follows a more narrow approach.99  In 
adopting the Eighth Circuit’s departure approach, one district court 
explained that the standard required that the defendant be 
“unquestionably irreplaceable and critically necessary to effectively 
provide for a significantly ill and innocent family member.”100  The 
                                                                                                             
circumstances were within the “heartland” of typical cases); Unites States v. Sorto, No. CR 
07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (D.N.M. May 5, 2008) (“‘When used as the sole basis for 
departure, family circumstances must be ‘extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Jones, 
159 F.3d 492, 499 (10th Cir. 1998))); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 
2008 WL 2371564, at *6 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008) (“[Family] circumstances may be sufficiently 
extraordinary that they are accepted as a basis for departure . . . .”); United States v. 
Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (D.N.M. Oct. 10, 2007) (“In 
extraordinary circumstances . . . the court has the authority to depart downward [based on 
family ties].”); United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7 (E.D. Wis. 
Aug. 22, 2007) (“[W]hile family responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in determining 
an appropriate sentence, they are a proper consideration when they are shown to be 
extraordinary.”); United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577, 
at *4 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“[A] district court may depart based on family circumstances 
‘only if the factor is present to an exceptional degree or in some other way makes the case 
different from the ordinary case where the factor is present.’” (quoting Koon v. United 
States, 518 U.S. 81, 96 (1996))); United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 
2165717, at *1 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006) (“[T]he court recognizes that it has discretion to 
depart on the grounds of exceptional family circumstances.”); United States v. Bailey, 369 F. 
Supp. 2d 1090, 1101 (D. Neb. 2005) (“Before departing from the Guidelines, a sentencing 
court first must determine whether a particular case presents features that ‘take it outside 
the Guidelines' “heartland” and make of it a special, or unusual, case.’” (quoting Koon, 518 
U.S. at 95)); United States v. Marinaro, No. CR 03 80 B W, 2005 WL 851334, at *5 (D. Me. 
Apr. 13, 2005) (“The court should depart on [the] basis [of family ties] ‘only if the factor is 
present to an exceptional degree . . . .’” (quoting, in part, Koon, 518 U.S. at 96)). 
98 See Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (“The requirement that the family 
circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they 
must only be outside the ordinary.”); Eriacho, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (“The requirement 
that the family circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-
extraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”); United States v. Hendry, No. 05-
40151-01-SAC, 2006 WL 3497772, at *2 (D. Kan. Dec. 5, 2006) (“Family circumstances are 
only considered in the most extraordinary situations.  The defendant’s status as a single 
mother is not such an extraordinary situation. . . . ‘[It] is unfortunately, not very 
uncommon. . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting, in part, United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 
596 (10th Cir. 2006))). 
99 See Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1101 (adopting the Eight Circuit’s family ties departure 
standard).  The district court explained the Eighth Circuit’s family ties departure standard 
as requiring that “the defendant's care for an innocent family member [be] unquestionably 
irreplaceable and critically necessary to effectively provide for a significantly ill and 
innocent family member.”  Id. 
100 Id.  In adopting the Eighth Circuit’s standard, the district court tailored the standard 
even more narrowly to classify an “innocent family member” as a child.  Id. at 1102.  The 
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Fourth Circuit has adopted a similar standard, but only requires that the 
defendant be “irreplaceable” without the additional context of caring for 
an ill family member.101    
The Guidelines themselves have also informed the courts’ family ties 
departure analysis.102  For example, the Seventh Circuit utilizes the 
section 5H1.6 commentary in determining whether a defendant’s family 
ties are sufficiently “extraordinary” to warrant departure.103  Similarly, 
                                                                                                             
court provided that “where a child is especially vulnerable and the defendant truly 
irreplaceable to the child’s recovery, a departure is warranted.”  Id. 
101 See Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1 (“[A] sentencing court may not depart downward 
or reduce a sentence on [the basis of family ties] unless it finds that a defendant is 
‘irreplacable’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 434 (4th Cir. 1997))).  The 
Fourth Circuit continues to rely on the standard expounded in Koon, namely that “a 
defendant’s sentence based on family ties and responsibilities is discouraged, absent a 
finding that ‘the defendant’s family ties or responsibilities are extraordinary.’”  Id. (emphasis 
added) (quoting Wilson, 114 F.3d at 434).  However, in interpreting the meaning of 
“extraordinary,” the Fourth Circuit explains that “a sentencing court may not depart 
downward or reduce a sentence on this basis unless it finds that a defendant is 
‘irreplaceable.’”  Id. (quoting Elliot v. United States, 332 F.3d 753, 769 (4th Cir. 2003)). 
102 See Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8 (applying Guidelines section 5H1.6 
commentary to determine whether the defendant’s family circumstances warranted 
departure); Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *1–2 (applying Guidelines section 5H1.6 
commentary to determine whether the defendant’s family circumstances warranted 
departure).  In Davis, the court considered whether: 
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of 
essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s 
family.   
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially exceeds 
the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a similarly situated 
defendant. . . .  
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which no 
effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably are available, 
making the defendant’s caretaking or financial support irreplaceable to 
the defendant’s family.   
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking or 
financial support. 
Id.; see supra note 87 (providing amendments to the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary). 
103 Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8; see supra note 87 (providing the amendments to 
the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary).  The court explained the Seventh Circuit 
departure standard as this:  “[W]hile family responsibilities are not ordinarily relevant in 
determining an appropriate sentence, they are a proper consideration when they are shown 
to be extraordinary.”  Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764 at *7 (emphasis added); see, e.g., United 
States v. Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (“A 
defendant’s responsibilities to a child or an infirm family member properly may serve as a 
basis for departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member exceeds that 
which a normal family member would experience from incarceration of a caregiver, and 
care from other sources is not reasonable [sic] available to alleviate the harm.”).  The court 
went on to apply the standard to the defendant’s situation according to the factors 
enumerated in Guidelines section 5H1.6.  Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8; see United 
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the Second Circuit utilizes section 5H1.6 for family ties departures as 
well but has narrowed the language in a way that requires defendants to 
show “particularly severe hardship” to the family upon their 
incarceration.104  
While family ties departure standards vary across the federal 
circuits, a similar pattern exists between district courts within the same 
circuit.105  Namely, district courts in the Tenth Circuit have varied widely 
in applying the “extraordinary” standard to family ties departures, even 
within a single district court over time.106  For example, in decisions 
handed down in 2007 and 2008, the District Court for the District of New 
Mexico broadly construed “extraordinary” family ties and 
responsibilities to include those that are “outside the ordinary.”107  
However, in two other decisions handed down in those same years, that 
same district court more narrowly defined its family ties departure 
standard to encompass situations where the defendant’s incarceration 
has a substantially negative impact on his or her family members.108  The 
                                                                                                             
States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (applying the factors in 
Guidelines section 5H1.6 to the defendant’s motion for downward departure based on 
family ties and responsibilities). 
104 Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *1–2 (quoting United States v. Selioutsky, 409 F.3d 114, 119 
(2d Cir. 2005)).  In Davis, the court first recognized that Guidelines section 5H1.6 provided 
the proper inquiry for the defendant’s claim.  Id.; see also supra note 102 (providing the 
language utilized by the court in Davis).  However, in examining that language, the court 
adopted the Second Circuit’s prevalent family ties departure standard, which provides that 
“[a] departure . . . is not available ‘where other relatives could meet the family’s 
needs . . . or the defendant’s absence did not cause a particularly severe hardship.’”  Davis, 
2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (emphasis added) (quoting Selioutsky, 409 F.3d at 119).  
105 See infra notes 106–09 (providing family ties departures standards within the Tenth 
Circuit). 
106 See, e.g., United States v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *1 (D.N.M. 
May 5, 2008); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 2008 WL 2371564, at *1 
(D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008); United States v. Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *1 
(D.N.M. Oct. 10, 2007); United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 
1302577, at *1 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007); United States v. Novack, No. 05-10058-01-WEB, 2006 
WL 1314295, at *1 (D. Kan. May 11, 2006). 
107 Herrera-Gonzalez, 2008 WL 2371564, at *7 (“The requirement that the family 
circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they 
must only be outside the ordinary.”); Eriacho, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (“The requirement 
that family circumstances be extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-
extraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”). 
108 Sorto, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (“‘To warrant departure on this basis, a defendant must 
demonstrate that the period of incarceration set by the Guidelines would have an effect on 
the family or family members beyond the disruption to family and parental relationships 
that would be present in the usual case.’” (quoting United States v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d 
1203, 1214 (D.N.M. 2005))); see Hernandez-Castillo, 2007 WL 1302577, at *6 (“The Court 
believes that the focus of U.S.S.G. [section] 5H1.6 is on the loss of caretaking and financial 
support for the defendant’s family that a defendant’s incarceration would cause.”). 
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U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas, on the other hand, requires 
that the defendant’s care be “irreplaceable” to warrant a family ties 
departure.109  
While it appears that courts recognize differences in prevailing 
departure standards, these inconsistencies remain nonetheless.110  
Because district courts have continuously wielded wide discretion in 
family ties departures, this area of federal sentencing lacks uniformity 
and objective analysis.111 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The vague “extraordinary” departure standard set forth in Koon 
sparked confusion among district courts in determining whether a 
defendant’s circumstances warranted departure based on the 
defendant’s family ties.112  Despite amendments to the now “advisory” 
Guidelines, district courts continue to embrace the vague 
“extraordinary” standard in Koon when determining whether to depart 
on the basis of family ties.113  Although the amended Guidelines section 
5H1.6 commentary could inform the problematic Koon standard by 
                                                 
109 Novack, 2006 WL 1314295, at *1 (“A downward departure for extraordinary family 
circumstances may be appropriate where the care provided by the defendant is 
‘irreplaceable or otherwise extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Roselli, 366 F.3d 58, 
69 (1st Cir. 2004))).  The district court, however, did not expound upon its meaning of 
“irreplaceable” in the opinion.  Id. at *1–2. 
110 See United States v. Hughes, No. 04 445 (CKK), 2006 WL 2092634, at *7 (D.D.C. July 27, 
2006) (noting that “it appears that this Circuit has a narrower view of ‘extraordinary’ 
circumstances that might warrant a family ties and responsibilities downward departure 
pursuant to the Sentencing Guidelines, as compared to the Second Circuit”).  The court in 
Hughes compared its D.C. Circuit standard, which recognizes that “the imposition of prison 
sentences normally disrupts . . . parental relationships” and thus does not warrant 
departure, to that of the more lax Second Circuit approach.  Id.  The court noted that the 
Second Circuit allows for departures where the family’s stability depends on the 
defendant’s continued presence.  Id. at *6. 
111 See infra Part III (analyzing the reoccurring issues apparent in family ties departure 
determinations). 
112 See supra Part II.C.I for a discussion on the differing standards employed by district 
courts in determining family ties departures pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in 
Koon. 
113 Hofer, supra note 93, at 694–95.  Hofer notes that one of the biggest challenges to 
embracing the advisory role of the Guidelines in federal sentencing is district judges’ 
reluctance to stray from the Guidelines.  Id. at 695.  Hofer notes that “[s]ome . . . sentencing 
judges continue to describe sentencing in terms nearly indistinguishable from pre-Booker 
practice—calculation of the guidelines followed by a search for anything ‘unusual’ or 
‘atypical’ about an offense or defendant that might take the case out of the ‘heartland’ and 
justify a sentence outside the guidelines range.”  Id. at 694–95; see supra note 97 and 
accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’ continued reliance on the Koon 
standard). 
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appropriately focusing on the adverse effects of a sentence on the 
defendant’s family members, district courts have been slow to fully 
embrace this approach.114  
Rather, because district courts focus on whether “extraordinary” 
family circumstances are present, they have continued to apply their 
own varying standards and thus have failed to adopt a uniform standard 
under which to consider these decisions.115  Thus, the same issues 
apparent in departure decisions during the Koon era have continued, 
despite helpful Guidelines amendments.116  Namely, this inconsistent 
and unbridled standard results in unwarranted disparities between 
similarly situated defendants in family ties departure decisions.117  
Further, under these varying standards district courts have either 
completely failed to emphasize the harm families experience upon a 
defendant’s incarceration in family ties departures or, in the alternative, 
have failed to do so in an objective manner, and thus have allowed 
                                                 
114 See supra note 87 (providing the text of the amended Guidelines section 5H1.6 
commentary pursuant to the PROTECT Act).  The commentary language addressing 
“[d]epartures [b]ased on [l]oss of [c]aretaking or [f]inancial [s]upport” provides a good 
starting point for addressing the detrimental effect of incarceration on a defendant’s 
innocent dependents and family members.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 
policy statement (2003); see supra Part II.B (discussing the harm caused by incarceration to a 
defendant’s family and society in general).  However, as the commentary language stands, 
courts may utilize these factors if they deem necessary but are not directed to in every case.  
See, e.g., United States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *1 (D. Conn. July 
31, 2006).  In Davis, the court noted that “[i]n order to depart [based on family ties], the 
court must find the family circumstances to be ‘exceptional’. . . [but] when the defendant 
argues for a departure based on ‘loss of caretaking or financial support,’ . . . the court is required 
to consider the presence of the [the factors outlined in Guidelines section 5H1.6].”  Id. 
(emphasis added).  While some courts have shifted their focus to the effect of incarceration 
on a defendant’s family, others have not.  Compare United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. 
CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 1302577, at *6 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“The Court believes the 
focus of U.S.S.G. § 5H1.6 is on the loss of caretaking and financial support for the 
defendant’s family that a defendant’s incarceration would cause.”), and United States v. 
Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 5, 2005) (“A defendant’s 
responsibilities to a child or infirm family member properly may serve as a basis for a 
departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member exceeds that which a 
normal family member would experience from incarceration of a caregiver . . . .” (emphasis 
added)), with United States v. Eriacho, No. CR 06 2168 JB, 2007 WL 6364848, at *4 (D.N.M. 
Oct. 10, 2007) (“The requirement that the family circumstances be extraordinary does not 
mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they must only be outside the ordinary.”). 
115 See supra Part II.C (discussing the differing family ties departure standards utilized by 
district courts). 
116 Compare infra Parts III.A.1, B.1 (examining disparities and reliance on gender-
stereotyping in family ties departure under Koon and the Guidelines), with infra Parts 
III.A.2, B.2 (examining disparities and judicial reliance on gender-stereotyping in family 
ties departures under the amended Guidelines). 
117 See infra Part III.A (discussing continued disparities in family ties departure 
jurisprudence). 
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unfounded notions of gender bias and stereotyping to influence federal 
sentencing.118  
To begin, Part III.A.1 of this Note first analyzes unwarranted 
disparities in family ties departures that existed under the discretionary 
Koon regime.119  Part III.A.2 then examines how courts have failed to 
adopt a uniform departure standard and thus have continued to engage 
in disparate departure determinations contrary to the goals of sentencing 
uniformity.120  Next, Part III.B.1 examines departures determinations 
under Koon that properly focused on the detrimental family impact of 
incarceration yet provided too much discretion, thus resulting in judicial 
reliance on gender stereotypes rather than objective analysis.121  Finally, 
Part III.B.2 examines application of family ties departure standards post-
amendment to show that courts have continued to exercise wide 
discretion in this area and thus have failed to engage in meaningful 
objective analysis.122 
A. Unwarranted Disparities in Family Ties and Responsibilities Departures 
for Similarly Situated Defendants Due to the Lack of a Uniform Departure 
Standard   
Although Guidelines section 5H1.6, which addresses departures 
based on family ties and responsibilities, has undergone substantial 
amendments pursuant to the PROTECT Act, federal district courts 
continue to apply the vague “extraordinary” model explained in Koon 
when faced with family ties departures.123  However, federal district 
courts have inconsistently interpreted the term “extraordinary” and thus 
have developed individualized standards regarding those circumstances 
                                                 
118 See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental effects of a defendant’s incarceration on 
his or her family members); see also infra Part III.B (examining district court standards that 
fail to objectively focus on the harm to a defendant’s family upon his or her incarceration). 
119 See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing disparities in departures between similarly situated 
defendants under Koon). 
120 See infra Part III.A.2 (analyzing disparities in departures between similarly situated 
defendants under the amended Guidelines). 
121 See infra Part III.B.1 (analyzing the lack of objective analysis in family ties departures 
under Koon). 
122 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the lack of objective analysis in family ties departures 
under the amended Guidelines). 
123 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’ 
continued reliance on the Koon “extraordinary” standard after amendments to the 
Guidelines); see also, e.g., United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL 
4813279, at *1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (“[A] reduction in a defendant's sentence based on 
family ties and responsibilities is discouraged, absent a finding that ‘the defendant's family 
ties or responsibilities are extraordinary.’” (quoting United States v. Wilson, 114 F.3d 429, 
434 (4th Cir. 1997))). 
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that might warrant a departure based on family ties.124  Naturally, 
application of these differing standards has produced unwarranted 
disparities in family ties departures among similarly situated 
defendants.125  Such disparities stand in direct contrast with Congress’ 
goal of uniformity in federal sentencing.126  Because the Commission 
promulgated the Guidelines in order to address this precise issue, 
continued application of these highly discretionary standards will 
undermine the purpose of the Guidelines.127 
1. Disparate Family Ties Departure for Similarly Situated Defendant 
Under the Koon “Extraordinary” Standard 
Because sentencing judges were afforded too much discretion to 
depart from the Guidelines under the Koon standard, application of that 
standard to family ties departures resulted in the failure of courts to 
attain the goals of uniformity.128  Not surprisingly, application of the 
                                                 
124 See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of the differing family ties departure 
standards utilized by district courts under Koon and following amendments to the 
Guidelines). 
125 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the continued disparities in departures between 
similarly situated defendants under Guidelines section 5H1.6). 
126 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(6) (2006) (“The court, in determining the particular sentence to 
be imposed, shall consider . . . the need to avoid unwarranted sentence disparities . . . .”); 
see also supra note 31 (discussing Congress’ goal to achieve uniformity in federal 
sentencing). 
127 See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at ch. 1, pt. A, introductory cmt. 3 (2012) 
(recognizing that Congress sought uniformity in sentencing in promulgating the 
Guidelines).  Initially, Congress promulgated the SRA in order to create an effective federal 
sentencing scheme with uniformity, honesty, and proportionality at its center.  Id.; see 
Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22, at 57–58 (“The [SRA] . . . [was] [e]nacted in response to 
widespread unwarranted sentencing disparity . . . [and was] designed to promote 
uniformity by curtailing judicial discretion.”).  However, even under the advisory 
Guidelines, the Supreme Court recognized the important role the Guidelines played in 
reaching Congress’s goal of national uniformity in sentencing.  United States v. Booker, 543 
U.S. 220, 246 (2005).  To ensure this goal would be met, the Court required that federal 
sentences be “reasonable” and permitted appellate courts to impose a presumption of 
reasonableness on sentences within the applicable guideline range.  Id. at 260–61; see Gall v. 
United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007) (reiterating this principle). 
128 See supra note 31 (providing the purpose of the Guidelines in response to 
indeterminate sentencing).  In Booker, Justice Stevens argued in a dissenting opinion, joined 
by Justices Souter and Scalia (in part), that a federal sentencing regime with too much 
discretion would run contrary to Congressional intent.  Booker, 543 U.S. at 296 (Stevens, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stevens argued that a set of advisory Guidelines would allow for too 
much discretion in federal sentencing in direct contrast with the sentiments of those 
Congressmen involved with the SRA.  Id.  For example, in discussing sentencing issues 
prior to implementation of the Guidelines, one senator remarked that “[t]he present 
problem with disparity in sentencing . . . stems precisely from the failure of [f]ederal 
judges—individually and collectively—to sentence similarly situated defendants in a 
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differing standards for family ties departures that existed among federal 
courts under Koon resulted in disparities between court determinations 
of “extraordinary” family circumstances warranting departure, even 
where the circumstances were similar.129    
Given the purpose and goals inherent in the Guidelines, defendants 
who face similar family circumstances should experience similar success 
or failure when seeking sentencing departures based on family ties.130  
However, defendants with similar family circumstances sentenced in 
different circuits under the Koon regime faced a contrary reality due to 
the application of varying departure standards.131  For example, the 
likelihood that a defendant acting as the sole caretaker for elderly 
parents would receive a family ties departure would wholly depend on 
the standard applied in that jurisdiction.132  If sentenced under the 
                                                                                                             
consistent, reasonable manner.”  Id. at 297 (quoting Sen. Laxalt) (citing 130 Cong. Rec. 976 
(1984)). 
129 But see generally Goldsmith & Porter, supra note 22 (arguing that disparities in family 
ties departures stem from inconsistent standards of review among the appellate courts as 
well as lack of guidance from the Commission).  Goldsmith and Porter primarily argue that 
the Supreme Court’s decision in Koon set a confusing example for federal appellate courts 
when reviewing sentencing decisions so that disparity existed in departure determinations.  
Id. at 88–89.  To illustrate this contention, Goldsmith and Porter briefly review broad topics 
such as “single-parenting,” a “defendant’s responsibilities in [a] two-parent home,” and a 
“defendant’s care of [a] spouse, parent, or sibling” in discussing disparities between federal 
circuits granting family ties departures since Koon.  Id. at 75–78.  Goldsmith and Porter 
similarly discuss disparities between the federal circuits when granting departures based 
on a defendant’s aberrant behavior as more evidence of the Court’s problematic stance in 
Koon.  Id. at 78–79. 
130 See id. at 74–76, 83 (using disparities between family ties departures under Koon to 
argue that departure analysis should undergo change in order to reduce sentencing 
disparity). 
131 See infra notes 132–37 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties 
departures between sentencing decisions arising in the Seventh and Second Circuits). 
132 See, e.g., United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d 218, 220 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (noting that 
the defendant moved for family ties departure based on his role as sole caregiver to his 
elderly father); United States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 942–43 (E.D. Wis. 2003) 
(noting that the defendant moved for family ties departure based on her role as primary 
caretaker to her elderly parents).  In Pearson, the defendant resided with her parents, 
cooked for them, completed their shopping, drove them to their respective medical 
appointments, administered their medication, and managed the household from day to 
day.  Id. at 943.  The defendant’s father was sixty-three years old and suffered from 
diabetes and kidney failure, which rendered him “essentially bed-ridden” as he awaited a 
kidney transplant.  Id.  The defendant’s mother was fifty-nine years old and suffered from 
diabetes, problems with her kidney, Crohn’s disease, and lymphedema in her leg.  Id.  The 
defendant’s mother also had a history of strokes and required the use of a wheelchair 
because of a heal infection caused by diabetes complications.  Id.  In Robles, the defendant, 
much like the defendant in Pearson, undertook significant responsibilities for his ailing 
parent, including the completion of his father’s cooking, cleaning, and shopping.  Robles, 
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Eastern District of Wisconsin’s broad “unnecessary hardship” standard, 
the defendant would likely prevail due to the jurisdiction’s more holistic 
approach to family ties departures. 133  However, the defendant’s motion 
would likely fail if presented to a judge applying the Southern District of 
New York’s narrow “uniquely dependent” departure standard.134  Under 
the “unnecessary hardship” standard the court would look to all 
circumstances surrounding the claim in order to gauge whether or not 
departure was warranted. 135  However, under the “uniquely dependent” 
standard, the defendant would face a higher threshold in moving for 
departure based on the same family circumstances, thus making success 
more difficult. 136  This kind of unwarranted disparity between similarly 
                                                                                                             
331 F. Supp. 2d at 220. The defendant’s father had undergone two open-heart surgeries, 
wore a pacemaker, and also suffered from seizures.  Id.   
133 See Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 946 (granting the defendant’s motion for family ties 
departures under its “unnecessary hardship” standard); see also supra note 83 (providing 
the departure standard utilized in Pearson).  In applying its “unnecessary hardship” 
standard, the court looked to the specific circumstances of the defendant’s family situation.  
Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943.  The court also considered sentencing factors such as “the 
need for just punishment, protection of the public, deterrence, and rehabilitation of the 
defendant.”  Id.; see supra note 93 (providing the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3553(a)). 
134 See Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure based 
on family ties under its “uniquely dependent” standard); see also supra note 79 (providing 
the departure standard in Robles).  In explaining its family ties departure standard, the 
court explained that hardship to the defendant’s family was not sufficient.  Robles, 331 F. 
Supp. 2d at 221.  
135 See, e.g., Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 942–46.  In Pearson, one of the defendant’s siblings 
lived nearby, another sibling was unable to drive, and the third sibling lived only a few 
hours away.  Id. at 943.  In granting departure, the court reasoned that despite their 
proximity, the defendant’s siblings would not be able to take on the defendant’s family 
responsibilities given their limited availability to provide care.  Id. at 945.  The court 
recognized that the defendant’s sister could provide in-home care but would not be 
available to provide transportation to medical appointments or perform any required 
housework.  Id.  The court further found it impossible for the defendant’s brother to care 
for the parents due to the amount of travel required by his full-time job.  Id.  The court also 
struck down the possibility of a private caregiver during the defendant’s incarceration 
based on its expense to the public.  Id. at 943.  After considering all of these circumstances, 
the court concluded that the defendant’s family circumstances were unique because she 
actively served as the sole family member available to care for her parents.  Id. at 943, 946.  
Thus, the defendant’s absence upon imprisonment would cause an “unnecessary 
hardship” to her family.  Id. at 946. 
136 See Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (setting forth the “uniquely dependent” standard for 
family ties departures).  In Robles, the court held that the defendant’s family circumstances 
were not sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure because the mere presence of 
other family members stripped the defendant’s caretaking role of its uniqueness.  Id.  The 
court maintained this position despite statements from the defendant’s cousin and brother 
confirming the significance of the defendant’s caretaking in his father’s life.  Id. at 220–21.  
Unlike the court in Pearson, the court did not consider the potential difficulties or 
limitations that could affect the ability of the defendant’s family members to provide the 
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situated defendants would result under the Koon regime because courts 
failed to adopt uniform standards that would place a uniform focus on 
certain family circumstances. 137  
While unwarranted disparities in family ties departures existed 
across the federal circuits under the Koon regime, this problematic trend 
prevailed within federal circuits as well.  Under this scenario, a 
defendant’s success in attaining a family ties departure would wholly 
depend on the standard applied by sentencing judges within the same 
circuit.138  For example, a defendant’s success in moving for a family ties 
departure based on her substantial financial contributions would likely 
be inconsistent throughout the Seventh Circuit under Koon.139  If the 
defendant faced sentencing under the “atypical” family circumstances 
standard, she would be more likely to receive departure due to the 
                                                                                                             
same care in the defendant’s absence.  See id. at 221 (“Presumably, Robles’s cousin and the 
other members of his family also can assist in making care giving arrangements for 
Robles’s father during any period that Robles is incarcerated.  While it is not the Court’s 
intent to trivialize the logistical and financial effort that may be required in making these 
arrangements, such efforts do not provide a basis for a downward departure . . . .”). 
137 Compare Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d at 943, 946 (holding the defendants family 
circumstances warranted downward departure under the “unnecessary hardship” 
standard), with Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d at 221 (holding the defendant’s family circumstances 
did not warrant downward departure under the “uniquely dependent” standard).  But see 
Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 92 (1996) (discussing the enactment of the SRA in 
response to disparate sentencing between similarly situated offenders). 
138 See infra notes 139–42 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties 
departures between decisions arising within the Seventh Circuit). 
139 See, e.g., United States v. Owens, 145 F.3d 923, 926 (7th Cir. 1998) (providing that the 
defendant moved for family ties departure in the district court based on significant 
financial contributions to his family); United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D. 
Wis. 2006) (providing that the defendant moved for family ties departure based on 
significant financial contributions to support his family).  In Owens, both the defendant and 
his common-law wife worked to support their three small children.  Owens, 145 F.3d at 926.  
The defendant claimed that his partner would not be able to financially support their 
children in his absence and that the family would have to move to public-assisted housing 
and receive welfare benefits if forced to rely solely on his wife’s income during his 
incarceration.  Id.  While both the defendant and his common-law wife had received public 
assistance six years prior, neither had ever lived in public housing and both were able to 
maintain jobs in the years leading up to the defendant’s trial.  Id.   In support of his motion, 
at sentencing the defendant also argued that he visited daily with his brother, who suffered 
from Downs Syndrome.  Id.  Similarly, in Maas, the defendant claimed that his partner 
would face serious financial hardship upon his incarceration.  Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961.  
While the defendant was married, he argued his wife would not be able to financially 
support their two children on her own and as a result the family home would be foreclosed 
on.  Id.  The defendant also argued that no other family members were able to provide 
support for his wife and children during his incarceration as his mother struggled to raise 
her own children and his wife was estranged from her family.  Id. 
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latitude afforded the judge under this broad standard.140  However, if the 
court sentenced the defendant under a more exacting standard, such as 
the standard arising in the Seventh Circuit requiring that the defendant 
show great harm would result to her children upon incarceration, she 
would be much less likely to receive departure due to the circumscribed 
nature of this departure standard.141  Thus, a defendant in this situation 
would face unwarranted disparity in her sentencing throughout the 
circuit in which she resides, not because her family circumstances 
changed, but simply because courts have failed to adopt uniform family 
ties departure standards.142  
Under the highly discretionary Koon standard, court determinations 
created unwarranted disparities between similarly situated defendants 
because these courts analyzed cases under their own interpretations of 
“extraordinary” family circumstances.143  These problematic results run 
directly contrary to the goals of the Guidelines.144  Although 
amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6, pursuant to the PROTECT Act, 
provided courts with an opportunity to apply a more uniform departure 
standard, courts failed to embrace this language and continued to apply 
                                                 
140 See Owens, 145 F.3d at 926, 929 (providing the district judge’s departure determination 
and affirming the decision of the lower court on appeal); see also supra note 82 (providing 
the departure standard utilized in Owens).  In Owens, the court held that the defendant’s 
family circumstances warranted departure because the financial harm that the defendant’s 
family would suffer upon his incarceration rendered the circumstances “atypical” 
compared to other families whose family member faced sentencing under the Guidelines.  
Owens, 145 F.3d at 929.   
141 See Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 961 (holding the defendant was not entitled to a 
downward departure on the basis of extraordinary family circumstances); see also supra 
note 82 (providing the departure standard in Maas).  In applying this narrow standard the 
court in Maas mused that “some degree of financial hardship . . . from the absence of a 
parent through incarceration is not in itself sufficient as a basis for departure.”  Maas, 444 F. 
Supp. 2d at 961 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B)(ii) 
(2006)).  Here, similar to the defendant’s family in Owens, the defendant’s family risked the 
loss of their home and significant financial support upon the defendant’s imprisonment.  
Id.  In denying departure the court reasoned that the defendant’s family circumstances 
were not extraordinary because the defendant’s wife was employed and was still able to 
maintain an income during the defendant’s incarceration.  Id.  But see Owens, 145 F.3d at 926 
(providing that the defendant’s common-law wife was employed and maintained steady 
employment for the previous six years). 
142 Compare Owens, 145 F.3d at 929 (affirming the defendant’s family ties departure under 
the district court’s “atypical” family circumstances standard), with Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d at 
961 (denying the defendant’s family ties departure based on the court’s standard requiring 
that the defendant show significant harm to his children). 
143 See supra notes 128–42 and accompanying text (examining the disparities in family ties 
departures under Koon due to application of differing departure standards). 
144 See supra note 31 (discussing the goal of uniformity at the heart of the Guidelines). 
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differing standards, thus continuing the trend in unwarranted 
disparities.145 
2. Continued Disparities in Family Ties Departures Following 
Amendment to Guidelines Section 5H1.6 Pursuant to the PROTECT 
Act 
Despite the amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6, which 
presented federal courts with an opportunity to streamline analysis 
under family ties departures, courts continued to rely on the vague 
“extraordinary” standard in Koon and thus created the same inconsistent 
and disparate issues present in today’s federal sentencing arena.146  Thus, 
disparities in family ties departures continue between similarly situated 
defendants, contrary to the goals underlying the Guidelines.147  
                                                 
145 See infra Part III.A.2 (examining the continued disparities in family ties departures due 
to the lack of a uniform departure standard among courts following amendments to 
Guidelines section 5H1.6). 
146 See supra note 97 and accompanying text (providing examples of district courts’ 
continued reliance on the Koon departure standard).  Particularly, the application note 
concerning loss of essential caretaking or financial support could provide courts with a 
single standard that focuses on the detrimental impact of a defendant’s incarceration on 
innocent third parties.  See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental impact of 
incarceration on defendants’ family members); see also note 87 (providing the amendments 
to Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act).  But see supra note 53 and 
accompanying text (providing policy arguments against consideration of family 
circumstances in federal sentencing). 
147 See supra note 31 (discussing the goal of uniformity at the heart of the Guidelines).  
While courts differ in their applications of family ties departures, courts may also consider 
these factors in alternatively determining whether or not to grant a variance from the 
Guidelines range based on 18 U.S.C. § 3553 sentencing factors.  See, e.g., United States v. 
Justice, No. CR 09-3078 JB, 2012 WL 394455, at *11–12 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012) (denying the 
defendant’s motion for departure based on family ties but granting the defendant’s motion 
to vary downward based on § 3553(a) sentencing factors); United States v. Martinez, No. 
CR 09-3078 JB, 2011 WL 6828055, at *4 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (“A district court may also 
rely on the existence of family ties and responsibilities in varying downward on a 
defendant’s sentence.”).  However, variances from the Guidelines do not carry the same 
presumption of reasonableness that a Guidelines’ sentence, which includes departures, 
does on appeal.  See United States v. Hernandez-Castillo, No. CR 06-1537 JB, 2007 WL 
1302577, at *3 (D.N.M. Apr. 18, 2007) (“[I]f ‘the district court properly considered the 
relevant Guidelines range and sentenced the defendant within that range, the sentence is 
presumptively reasonable.’ . . . On the other hand, criminal sentences that vary materially 
from the properly calculated guideline sentencing range are not accorded a presumption of 
reasonableness.” (quoting United States v. Kristl, 437 F.3d 1050, 1055 (10th Cir. 2006))).  
Thus, consistent departures based on family ties and responsibilities still play an important 
role in ensuring similarly situated defendants receive similar sentences.  See United States 
v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *2 (D.N.M. May 5, 2008) (“[T]he court 
must still carefully consider possible departures under the Guidelines before it can 
meaningfully decide a variance request.”). 
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Similar to under the Koon regime, defendants with similar family 
circumstances sentenced today face inconsistent results due to the 
application of varying departure standards.148  As seen under the Koon 
era, the likelihood that a defendant would succeed in moving for a 
family ties departure based on her substantial financial contributions 
wholly depends on the standard applied in that jurisdiction.149  If the 
court in that jurisdiction follows the commentary to Guidelines section 
5H1.6, focusing on the loss of financial support or essential caretaking, it 
is more likely the defendant’s motion will succeed as the court would 
carefully consider the nature of the defendant’s family responsibilities.150  
However, if the court in that jurisdiction follows a more stringent 
departure standard, such as the Second Circuit’s “particularly severe 
hardship” standard, the defendant would be much less likely to receive 
departure due to the court’s much more narrow application.151  Thus, 
                                                 
148 See infra notes 149–52 and accompanying text (analyzing disparities in family ties 
departures between sentencing decisions arising in the Eleventh and Second Circuits). 
149 See, e.g., United States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (providing 
that the defendant moved for downward departure based on family ties based on the loss 
of financial support that incarceration would bring to his partner and her nephew); United 
States v. Davis, No. 3 06 cr 111 (JCH), 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (D. Conn. July 31, 2006) 
(providing that the defendant moved for downward departure based on the loss of 
financial support incarceration would bring to her husband and children).  In Rose, the 
defendant was in a committed twenty-year relationship with his girlfriend, helped care for 
the girlfriend’s autistic nephew, and provided the family’s primary source of income.  Rose, 
722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290.  In Davis, the defendant provided the primary means of financial 
support for her two children and unemployed husband.  Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2. 
150 See Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (granting the defendant’s motion for family ties 
departure after considering family circumstances under Guidelines section 5H1.6); see also 
supra note 87 (providing the text of the amended Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the 
PROTECT Act); supra note 103 (providing the court’s section 5H1.6 departure standard).  In 
granting the defendant’s motion for family ties departure, the court in Rose reasoned that 
“[a] guideline sentence would have ‘caused a substantial, direct, and specific loss of 
essential caretaking’ to Rose’s family” and therefore, the court granted the defendant a 
three-level departure.  Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (quoting U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
MANUAL § 5H1.6 cmt. n.1(B)(i) (2010)).  The court further reasoned that although the 
defendant’s long-time girlfriend was able to work she was “in dire need of [the 
defendant’s] support,” because she was “suffering without [the defendant] in the home,” 
and was “working night shifts, and . . . [was] forced to spend her resources in order to find 
care for her nephew.”  Id.  In Rose, the court carefully considered the nature of defendant’s 
family responsibilities to his girlfriend and her nephew.  Id.  The nephew suffered from 
autism and required “24-hour supervision.”  Id.  Along with his girlfriend, the defendant 
had acted as the nephew’s caretaker, as well as the family’s primary source of income.  Id. 
151 See Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *3 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure 
based on family ties under the Second Circuit’s “particularly severe hardship” standard); 
see also supra text accompanying note 104 (providing the Second Circuit departure 
standard).  In considering the defendant’s claim, the court in Davis placed substantial focus 
on whether or not other adults could care for a defendant’s dependents upon his or her 
incarceration.  Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2.  Though the court recognized that the family’s 
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this kind of unwarranted disparity between similarly situated 
defendants continues post-Koon because courts have failed to seize the 
opportunity for a uniform family ties departure standard and instead 
foolishly held on to their own.152   
Defendants moving for family ties departure based on critical 
emotional support provided to a vulnerable child would face similar 
unwarranted disparities depending on the sentencing jurisdiction.153  
Here, application of the Eighth Circuit’s narrow “irreplaceable” 
caretaker standard would likely result in downward departure, whereas 
application of the Fourth Circuit’s broad “irreplaceable” standard would 
likely produce the opposite result.154   Despite the similarity in family 
                                                                                                             
income would suffer, it reasoned that this was not the “‘type of loss that substantially 
exceeds the loss typically suffered by the family of defendants.’”  Id. (quoting U.S. 
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5H1.6, Application Note 1(R)(ii) (2006)).  The court 
determined that the defendant’s husband could adequately replace the defendant as the 
primary financial supporter by reasoning that the husband was “able to care for their 
daughters and is able to work,” and though “unemployed now, he has been employed in 
the recent past.”  Id.  The court rested its conclusion on the mere presumption that the 
defendant’s husband could gain employment rather than delving into the husband’s actual 
ability to step in and support the family.  Id.  This kind of consideration is in stark contrast 
with the court in Rose, which delved into the actualities of the defendant’s family 
responsibilities.  Compare Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (“[The defendant’s girlfriend] is 
working night shifts, and she is forced to spend her resources . . . because Rose is not 
available to help.”), with Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, at *2 (“[The defendant’s] husband is able 
to care for their daughters and is able to work. . . . While unemployed now, he has been 
employed in the recent past.”). 
152 Compare Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d at 1290 (granting the defendant’s family ties departure 
under the standard enumerated in Guidelines section 5H1.6), with Davis, 2006 WL 2165717, 
at *1–2 (denying the defendant’s motion for departure based on family ties under the 
Second Circuit’s “particularly severe hardship” standard).  In amending Guidelines section 
5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act, the Commission presented courts with a uniform 
standard applicable to family ties departures.  See supra note 87 (providing amendments to 
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). 
153 See, e.g., United States v. Williams, Cr. No. 6:07 cr 01207 GRA 1, 2012 WL 4813279, at 
*1 (D.S.C. Oct. 10, 2012) (providing that the defendant moved for downward departure 
based on family ties in light of his role in the life of his terminally ill daughter); United 
States v. Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1097–1100 (D. Neb. 2005) (providing that the 
defendant moved for downward departure based on family ties in light of the emotional 
support he provided for his young daughter suffering from emotional trauma).  In 
Williams, the defendant claimed he played a vital role in the life of his seven-year-old 
daughter who suffered from brain cancer.  Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1.  In Bailey, the 
defendant claimed that his emotional support was critically necessary to his young 
daughter who had suffered from emotional trauma.  Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1097–1100.  
The emotional trauma suffered by the defendant’s daughter stemmed from the sexual 
abuse she suffered at the hands of her mother’s boyfriend.  Id. at 1097. 
154 Compare Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *2 (denying the defendant’s motion to depart 
based on family ties under the Fourth Circuit’s “irreplaceable” departure standard), with 
Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1103 (granting the defendant’s motion to depart based on family 
ties under the Eight Circuit’s narrower “irreplaceable” departure standard).  See supra note 
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circumstances, defendants would experience disparate departures 
because application of the Eighth Circuit standard entails a more holistic 
focus on the defendant’s role regarding the vulnerable child.155  On the 
other hand, application of the Fourth Circuit standard focuses less on the 
defendant’s actual family role and thus leads to dissimilar departure 
determinations.156  If both jurisdictions were to similarly consider the 
effect of incarceration on innocent dependents, these departure 
determinations may prove more uniform and cohesive to the 
Congressional intent underlying the Guidelines.157  
As previously analyzed, some courts have failed to focus on the 
impact of a defendant’s incarceration on innocent family members when 
applying these differing family ties departure standards.158  While other 
                                                                                                             
99 (providing the Eighth Circuit departure standard utilized in Bailey); supra note 101 
(providing the Fourth Circuit departure standard utilized in Williams). 
155 See Bailey, 369 F. Supp. 2d at 1098–99 (considering the defendant’s role in his 
daughter’s well-being).  In considering the defendant’s motion to depart, the presiding 
judge recounted his gut reaction to the motion and then explained how analyzing the 
actual facts of the case changed his mind: 
Indeed, when I first skimmed the motion to depart under U.S.S.G. 
§ 5K2.0 in this case, my reaction was quick and visceral:  “Are you 
kidding me?”  The Assistant Federal Public Defender asked me to 
impose a non-prison sentence on Bailey, a fellow who possessed child 
pornography, in order to save the defendant’s little girl.  No way, I 
thought, hell will freeze over before that happens.  I next explain how 
hell froze over. 
Id. at 1091.  In determining that departure was warranted the court looked to the effect the 
defendant’s incarceration would have on his daughter.  Id. at 1198–99.  The court reasoned 
that the defendant’s daughter suffered from a serious condition where the presence of the 
defendant’s emotional support was critical to the child’s recovery and could not be 
duplicated.  Id. at 1103.  The court relied on evidence from a forensic psychologist’s report 
indicating that the daughter suffered from symptoms indicating post-traumatic stress 
disorder and had continuously expressed trust in her father, the defendant.  Id. at 1098–99.  
The court also analyzed a variety of possible alternative caregivers in the event that the 
defendant was incarcerated but ultimately determined that none were appropriate or as 
effective as the defendant.  Id. at 1099–1100.  For example, the court reasoned that the 
defendant’s mother and father were unavailable because of age and health issues.  Id.  
156 See Williams, 2012 WL 4813279, at *1–2 (demonstrating a lack of consideration by the 
court regarding the defendant’s role in his daughter’s life).  In denying a family ties 
departure, the court in Williams failed to focus on the health consequences faced by the 
defendant’s daughter upon his incarceration.  Id.  Rather, the court simply reasoned that 
the defendant’s circumstances were not “extraordinary” in light of the fact that the 
defendant had not maintained custody of his daughter in the past.  Id. at *2.  The court 
noted that custody of the defendant’s daughter had moved from her mother to a third 
party.  Id. 
157 See supra note 31 (providing the goals and purposes underlying the SRA and the 
Guidelines). 
158 See supra notes 128–57 and accompanying text (examining the disparities between 
district courts’ approaches to family ties departures). 
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courts have been more successful in this regard, these standards provide 
sentencing judges with too much discretion and lead to a lack of 
objective analysis in family ties departure determinations.159 
B. Judicial Reliance on Gender Stereotyping in the Exercise of Discretion to 
Depart Based on Family Ties and Responsibilities   
The lack of uniformity regarding family ties departures among 
federal courts has produced different court interpretations of the term 
“extraordinary,” which often leads to unwarranted disparities in 
departure determinations.160  One prevalent issue in these differing 
standards is that some district courts fail to take into account the 
detriment caused to the family following the defendant’s 
incarceration.161  However, harm to the family should be at the center of 
family ties departure analysis because such consequences can wreak 
punishment beyond that typically encompassed by imprisonment.162  
Some courts have properly focused on the detrimental impact of a 
defendant’s incarceration under the Guidelines in determining whether a 
family ties departure is warranted.163  While this trend better addresses 
                                                 
159 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective analysis and reliance on 
gender stereotyping present in family ties departure determinations). 
160 See supra Part III.A (analyzing the continuing problematic disparities in family ties 
departures stemming from different district court departure standards).  
161 See, e.g., United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 195 (3d Cir. 2002) (“[T]he term 
‘extraordinary’ . . . retains its literal meaning:  the circumstances of the case must simply 
place it outside the ordinary.”); United States v. Herrera-Gonzalez, No. CR 07-1602 JB, 2008 
WL 2371564, at *7 (D.N.M. Feb. 6, 2008) (“The requirement that the family circumstances be 
extraordinary does not mean that they must be extra-extraordinary; they must only be 
outside the ordinary.”); see also supra Part II.B (discussing the harmful effects of 
incarceration on inmates’ families). 
162 See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006) (“The court shall impose a sentence sufficient, but not 
greater than necessary . . . .”); see also Bush, supra note 46, at 195 (discussing the importance 
of considering the defendant’s dependents at sentencing in order to affect the purposes of 
§ 3553(a)); Ellingstad, supra note 46, at 980–81 (discussing the social costs of incarceration). 
The Second Circuit recognized this principle in United States v. Johnson.  964 F.2d 124, 129–
30 (2d Cir. 1992).  There the defendant was solely responsible for caring for four children 
under the age of six, one of which belonged to her institutionalized daughter.  Id. at 126.  
The defendant was convicted of stealing money from the government by inflating her 
paychecks in her position as a payroll clerk at the Bronx V.A. Hospital.  Id.  In affirming the 
district court’s decision to depart based on family ties, the Second Circuit held that the 
departure had properly been based on reducing the substantial harm faced by the 
defendant’s children upon her incarceration.  Id. at 129–30.  But see supra note 53 and 
accompanying text (discussing policy arguments against consideration of family 
circumstances in federal sentencing). 
163 See, e.g., United States v. Sorto, No. CR 07-0158 JB, 2008 WL 4104121, at *3 (D.N.M. 
May 5, 2008) (“‘To warrant departure on this basis, a defendant must demonstrate that the 
period of incarceration set by the Guidelines would have an effect on the family or family 
members beyond the disruption to family and parental relationships that would be present 
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the issue of innocent family members in federal sentencing, courts often 
fail to consider this impact in a meaningful way.  Rather than using 
objective factors to measure a defendant’s caretaking abilities or financial 
support to his or her family, courts often rely on notions of stereotypical 
gender roles when determining whether the defendant’s absence will 
harm the family.164  This trend appeared under the vague 
“extraordinary” standard in Koon and has continued under subsequent 
amendments to the Guidelines.165  Although recent amendments offer an 
opportunity for courts to more adequately focus on this important aspect 
of family ties departures, courts have not fully or meaningfully 
embraced them.166  Thus, the same risk that courts will improperly rely 
on gender stereotypes in family ties departures continues at present.167 
1. Judicial Reliance on Gender Stereotyping Under the Koon 
“Extraordinary” Standard    
Court determinations of “extraordinary” family circumstances under 
the differing departure standards following the Supreme Court’s 
decision in Koon often evinced notions of gender stereotyping.168  Courts 
often focused on presumptive notions that female defendants act as 
                                                                                                             
in the usual case.’” (quoting United States v. Palma, 376 F. Supp. 2d 1203, 1214 (D.N.M. 
2005))); United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Family 
circumstances are extraordinary when exceptional hardship to a defendant’s family would 
result from a sentence within the Guidelines range . . . .”). 
164 See infra Part III (analyzing the continuing lack of objective family ties departure 
standards and courts’ reliance on gender stereotypes in departure decisions under the 
Guidelines). 
165 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective family ties departure 
standards and courts’ reliance on gender stereotypes in departure decisions under the 
Guidlines).  While the Guidelines section 5H1.6 commentary does not yet include objective 
factors to guide a court’s analysis, this standard provides a good starting point for 
meaningful family ties departures.  See supra note 87 (providing the amendments to 
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). 
166 See supra Part II.C (providing an overview of district court family ties departure 
standards under the Guidelines); see also supra note 87 (providing the amendments to 
Guidelines section 5H1.6 pursuant to the PROTECT Act). 
167 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the continuing lack of objective analysis in court 
determinations of family ties departures under the Guidelines).  
168 See King, supra note 11, at 289–300, for a discussion of the presence of gender bias 
under the Guidelines, including the deep-rooted societal view of women as caretakers.  
Another critic also recognizes the presence of gender stereotypes in sentencing 
determinations.  Bush, supra note 46, at 196.  Bush notes that judges themselves recognize 
that they regard maternal caretaking, as opposed to paternal caretaking, more highly in 
making sentencing determinations.  Id.  Bush further notes that “[s]uch special regard for 
maternal care may reflect stereotypes more than it does reality” as family members may 
equally suffer harm at the loss of paternal care.  Id. 
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family caretakers, especially in regards to minor dependents.169  Some 
courts completely failed to objectively consider defendants’ roles in the 
family by regarding single parents as an ordinary family circumstance 
given the frequency with which it occurs today.170  However, other 
courts focused on the effects of a single mother’s incarceration on minor 
dependents to find that mere status as a single mother is sufficiently 
“extraordinary” to warrant departure, despite a lack of objective inquiry 
aimed at gauging the reality of the defendant as caretaker.171  This lack of 
objective inquiry indicates that sentencing judges rely on their own 
assumptions concerning gender roles in the family.172  However, if courts 
are to meaningfully engage in family ties departures that truly address 
harm to the family they must objectively analyze the defendant’s actual 
role within the family unit.173  
Indeed, family ties departures based on the defendant’s status as a 
single mother have been granted even in spite of policies against 
decreased sentencing in such circumstances.174  To illustrate, consider a 
                                                 
169 See generally Farrell, supra note 11 (discussing the influence of cultural assumptions 
pertaining to gender roles, including the view of women as self-sacrificing caretakers, in 
departure decisions based on family ties and responsibilities). 
170 See United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 82 (1st Cir. 2002) (“[S]ingle mother status is not 
an ‘idiosyncratic’ circumstance, distinguishing her case from the ‘mine-run.’” (quoting 
United States v. Chestna, 962 F.2d 103, 107 (1st Cir. 1992))); United States v. Brand, 907 F.2d 
31, 33 (4th Cir. 1990) (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in today’s society, and 
imprisoning such a parent will by definition separate the parent from the children.”).  
Under this approach, courts completely fail to objectively analyze the realities of the 
defendant’s family circumstances.  See, e.g., United States v. Patterson, 17 F. App’x 496, 497 
(8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the defendant’s status as a single mother of an infant was not 
extraordinary enough to remove the case from the “heartland” of the applicable guideline). 
171 See, e.g., United States v. White, 301 F. Supp. 2d 289, 295 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding that 
the female defendant’s family circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was 
the sole caregiver for her six young children); United States v. Norton, 218 F. Supp. 2d 1014, 
1017, 1020 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (holding that the female defendant’s family circumstances were 
extraordinary where the defendant was the sole caregiver for two young children and also 
assisted her nineteen-year-old son with college expenses and health insurance); United 
States v. Dyce, 975 F. Supp. 17, 22 (D.D.C. 1997) (holding that the female defendant’s family 
circumstances were extraordinary where the defendant was the sole caretaker of her three 
children).  But see Farrell, supra note 11, at 271 (arguing that women defendants are less 
likely to receive family ties departures based on their role as a mother because caretaking 
duties are culturally regarded as typical female family responsibilities and thus not 
“extraordinary”). 
172 See Wald, supra note 9, at 138 (recognizing the inclination of sentencing judges to 
reinforce gender stereotypes by implicitly regarding women as caretakers over men). 
173 See infra Part IV (suggesting amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 that would 
provide a uniform departure standard with objective criteria for court application). 
174 See supra note 53 (presenting policy arguments against departing on the basis of 
family ties).  Compare Brand, 907 F.2d at 33 (“A sole, custodial parent is not a rarity in 
today’s society . . . .”), with U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 1, pt. A, introductory 
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defendant who pled guilty to bank robbery and moved for a family ties 
departure based on the fact that she was a single mother to six 
children.175  In considering whether to depart, the court struggled with 
the seriousness of the defendant’s crime balanced against the need for 
general and specific deterrence, the improper implications of departing 
from the applicable sentence merely on the basis of motherhood, as well 
as the defendant’s lack of concern for her dependents’ well-being until 
faced with sentencing.176  Even against these policy considerations, the 
court incorrectly granted departure based on the hopes that the 
defendant could care for her children and remain together as a “family 
unit.”177  Successful departure in the face of these conflicting policies 
indicates that the sentencing judge based the decision on the mere idea 
of the defendant as a natural caregiver, despite finding that the 
defendant actually failed to act in the best interests of her children.178  
The court’s failure to objectively measure the defendant’s caretaking role 
indicates that departure was based on a gender stereotype rather than on 
meaningful analysis.179  
                                                                                                             
cmt. 1.4(b) (2012) (“[T]he Commission believes that despite the courts’ legal freedom to 
depart from the guidelines, they will not do so very often.”). 
175 White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 292–93.  The defendant and her female cousin acted as 
lookouts while sitting in a car outside of the bank where the violent robbery occurred.  Id. 
at 290. The defendant was the biological mother of five children and also retained custody 
of her younger sister.  Id. at 293. 
176 Id. at 296.  The court recognized that it had “to be concerned that a downward 
departure would send the wrong message that a defendant can commit a crime as serious 
as bank robbery and yet be permitted to hide behind her children.”  Id.  The court went on 
to recognize the impropriety of overlooking serious criminal conduct of single parents, 
especially “when those parents apparently do not become concerned with the well-being of 
their children until they are facing imprisonment.”  Id.  The court found that the defendant 
and her cousin were not concerned with their children’s well-being when engaging in the 
violent robbery, especially given the presence of the defendant’s infant cousin in the car 
during the robbery.  Id. 
177 Id. at 296–97; see supra note 53 and accompanying text (providing policy arguments 
against consideration of family circumstances in federal sentencing). 
178 White, 301 F. Supp. 2d at 296.  In granting the departure, the court significantly 
reduced the defendant’s sentence from a range of fifty-seven to seventy-one months to a 
range of twenty-four to thirty months.  Id. at 290, 297. 
179 See id. at 295–96 (determining departure without the use of objective factors).  In 
determining whether to depart, the court failed to look at objective information that would 
aid in analyzing the defendant’s role as caretaker.  Id. at 295–96.  But see United States v. 
Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *7–8 (E.D. Wis. Aug. 22, 2007) (considering 
letters from health care and social service providers as well as a family therapist when 
determining whether to depart based on family ties).  In White, the court only considered 
the age of the children and the presence of alternative caregivers.  White, 301 F. Supp. at 
295.  Even in considering alternative caregivers, though, the court simply cast away with 
one alternative based on its view that it was “unrealistic.”  Id. 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 [2013], Art. 6
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol48/iss1/6
2013] A Continuing Conundrum 261 
Male defendants, on the other hand, are not typically viewed as 
fulfilling the same natural caregiving role as female defendants in the 
context of family ties departures.180  Rather, male defendants are often 
depicted as the breadwinners or primary financial supporters of their 
families and as such, must show circumstances above and beyond 
significant monetary contribution to receive a reduced sentence based on 
family ties.181  By relying on these assumptions, courts failed to engage in 
meaningful departure analysis that focused on the resulting harm to the 
family from the male defendant’s absence.182  Unfortunately, this unjust 
trend has continued over time.183 
2. Continued Judicial Reliance on Gender Stereotyping    
Despite amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 that might inform 
departure analysis, courts have continued to focus on the ambiguous 
                                                 
180 See United States v. Louis, 300 F.3d 78, 83 (1st Cir. 2002) (reasoning that the male 
defendant’s family circumstances would not warrant a departure “even if [the defendant] 
could demonstrate that he was the only parent available to meet all of [his son’s] needs.” 
(first emphasis added)).  Compare United States v. Dominguez, 296 F.3d 192, 194, 199 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (holding the female defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances warranted 
departure where the defendant resided with and cared for her elderly parents), and United 
States v. Pearson, 282 F. Supp. 2d 941, 945–46 (E.D. Wis. 2003) (holding the female 
defendant’s extraordinary family circumstances warranted departure where the defendant 
resided with and cared for her infirm parents), with United States v. Robles, 331 F. Supp. 2d 
218, 221 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (holding the male defendant’s family circumstances were not 
sufficiently extraordinary to warrant departure where the defendant was responsible for 
giving significant care to his elderly father). 
181 Compare United States v. Carrasco, 271 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2001) (holding that the 
male defendant’s family circumstances did not warrant a family ties departure where the 
defendant was the primary source of financial support for his disabled wife and three 
children), and United States v. Maas, 444 F. Supp. 2d 952, 961 (E.D. Wis. 2006) (holding the 
male defendant was not entitled to family ties departure where his wife and children 
would only suffer economically during his incarceration), with United States v. Savulescu, 
No. 95 CR 511-2, 2002 WL 745787, at *1, *3 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 25, 2002) (holding the male 
defendant’s unique family circumstances warranted departure where the defendant solely 
provided financial support for his wife and where the defendant’s wife suffered from a 
debilitating mental illness), and United States v. Ayala, 75 F. Supp. 2d 126, 138 (S.D.N.Y. 
1999) (holding the male defendant’s family circumstances warranted departure where the 
defendant provided primary financial support for his wife and two children and where the 
defendant’s daughter suffered from Downs Syndrome and relied on the defendant for her 
unique medical care). 
182 See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s 
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general). 
183 See infra Part III.B.2 (analyzing the continuing trend in judicial bias and lack of 
objectivity following amendments to the Guidelines); see also Ramirez, supra note 14, at 594 
(“If judicial discretion is to be consistent with serving justice in the criminal justice system, 
a judge must exercise discretion free from bias.”). 
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departure standard set forth in Koon.184  Because the highly discretionary 
Koon standard lives on, notions of gender stereotyping continue to make 
their way into court decisions regarding family ties departures.185    
Similar to the era of family ties departures under Koon, some courts 
continue to place too much emphasis on the normalcy of single-
motherhood in family ties departures.186  By only considering the 
frequency with which this circumstance occurs, these courts fail to 
consider the harmful impact that the single parent’s incarceration may 
have on innocent family members.187  Further, while some courts have 
properly focused on whether the defendant’s sentence would negatively 
impact innocent family members, those courts continue to apply 
departure standards without meaningful attention to the defendant’s 
actual role in the family.188  Instead, when granting departures based on 
family ties, courts often rely on the stereotype that female defendants are 
natural caretakers, rather than considering objective factors that might 
substantiate that notion.189  
                                                 
184 See supra note 97 (providing examples of district court departure standards that 
continue to utilize the “extraordinary” inquiry prevalent in Koon). 
185 See supra Part III.B.1 (examining issues with gender stereotyping in the exercise of 
judicial discretion to depart based on family ties in the years after Koon). 
186 See, e.g., United States v. Hendry, No. 05-40151-01-SAC, 2006 WL 3497772, at *2 (D. 
Kan. Dec. 5, 2006) (“Family circumstances are only considered in the most extraordinary 
situations.  The defendant’s status as a single mother is not such an extraordinary 
situation. . . . ‘[It] is, unfortunately, not very uncommon . . . .’” (citations omitted) (quoting 
United States v. Cage, 451 F.3d 585, 596 (10th Cir. 2006))). 
187 See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s 
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general). 
188 See, e.g., United States v. Capri, No. 03 CR 300-1, 2005 WL 1916720, at *7 (N.D. Ill. July 
5, 2005) (“A defendant’s responsibilities to a child or an infirm family member properly 
may serve as a basis for a departure under the Guidelines, if the harm to the family member 
exceeds that which a normal family member would experience from incarceration of a 
caregiver, and care from other sources is not reasonable [sic] available to alleviate the 
harm.” (emphasis added)). 
189 Id. at *6 (granting the female defendant’s departure request without objectively 
analyzing her role within the family).  In considering whether to grant the defendant’s 
motion to depart based on family ties and responsibilities, the court in Capri noted that 
“[the defendant] has done a relatively good job caring for her children and managing her 
family” and “those who are currently taking care of her children may not be able to do as 
good a job as she has done.”  Id. (emphasis added).  The court came to this determination 
without an objective inquiry into the role and responsibility played by the defendant in the 
lives of her children.  Id. at *5–8; see also United States v. Martinez, No. CR 09-3078, 2011 
WL 6828055, at *4–6 (D.N.M. Dec. 19, 2011) (granting a family ties departure without 
objective analysis into the defendant’s role in her family).  The court in Martinez 
approached the defendant’s motion for a downward departure based on family ties in a 
similar fashion.  Id.  There, without objectively inquiring into the role played by the 
defendant regarding her children, the court concluded that “she will be able to take care of 
her family members” and that “[Martinez’s] progress in abstaining from 
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The trend in granting downward departures for single mothers 
continues in spite of policy considerations to the contrary.190  To 
illustrate, take for example a defendant who pled guilty to mail fraud 
and sought departure based on the fact that she was a single mother of 
four children.191  In determining whether to depart, the court struggled 
with the propriety of departure in light of the defendant’s lengthy 
criminal history, which indicated disregard of her role as a single 
mother.192  Despite its trepidation, the court incorrectly granted the 
downward departure based on its conclusory finding that the defendant 
had “done a relatively good job caring for her children and managing 
her family under very difficult circumstances.”193  In doing so, the court 
failed to objectively analyze the defendant’s caretaking role and thus 
likely based its decision on stereotypical gender assumptions.194    
Just as family ties departures continue to evince stereotypical female 
gender assumptions, the trend continues for males seeking departure as 
well.195  Unlike their supposed “caretaker” female counterparts, courts 
                                                                                                             
methamphetamine use encourages the Court that she will be able to fulfill these duties.”  
Id. at *5. 
190 See Martinez, 2011 WL 6828055, at *6 (“The Court is very cautious to not 
disproportionately sentence men to prison—who also plead that their family needs them—
and then let mothers serve no time in prison.  Punishment based solely on the defendant’s 
sex or their family role would be unfair and not just.”); see also supra note 53 and 
accompanying text (providing policy arguments against considering family circumstances 
in federal sentencing). 
191 Capri, 2005 WL 1916720, at *1.  The mail fraud charge arose from the defendant’s 
participation in an elaborate scheme to defraud a life insurance company.  Id.  The 
defendant assisted her co-defendant in securing a loan for $11,750,000 by providing 
information she knew or strongly suspected to be fraudulent.  Id.  The defendant also set 
up a sham company to aid in securing the loan with the intent that the company would 
receive loan proceeds.  Id. 
192 Id. at *6 (“[I]t is difficult to avoid the observation that Capri’s repeated decisions to 
commit serious crimes that she surely knew could subject her to incarceration are hardly a 
testament to good parenting.”)  Prior to the mail fraud charge, the defendant pled guilty to 
separate felony forgery offenses in both 1994 and 1998.  Id. at *3.  The defendant further 
pled guilty to “corruptly endeavoring to obstruct the due administration of the internal 
revenue laws” in 1999 after filing nineteen fraudulent tax returns for the year 1992.  Id.  
Finally, while awaiting sentencing for the mail fraud offense, the defendant was arrested 
for a separate fraud charge as well.  Id. 
193 Id. at *6.  The court came to this conclusion despite evidence that the defendant’s 
“house was filthy and in extreme disorder, lacked functioning lights, had what appeared to 
be several days of discarded food strewn throughout the kitchen, and had dirty clothing 
scattered over the floors.”  Id. at *4.  
194 See id at *5–6 (determining departure was warranted without analyzing objective 
factors to justify the decision). 
195 See, e.g., United States v. Justice, 2012 WL 394455, at *2, *11–12 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2012) 
(denying departure based on family ties where the defendant provided primary financial 
support to his wife and young child). 
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continue to depict male defendants as breadwinners or the primary 
financial supporters of their families who must show circumstances 
above and beyond significant monetary contribution to receive a 
departure.196  Reliance on stereotypical assumptions, such as females as 
“caretakers” and males as “breadwinners,” means that courts continue to 
engage in hollow family ties departures without regard to the actual role 
of defendants within their families or the harm that incarceration may 
cause.197  However, courts can adequately address these harms, through 
family ties departures, by objectively analyzing the defendant’s family 
situation.198  
Up to present, district courts have exercised wide discretion in 
developing their own standards for departures based on family ties.199  
However, such discretion has created unwarranted disparities in 
departure determinations and has permitted judges to freely rely on 
their own stereotypical assumptions in making those determinations.200  
Considering the issues that have plagued family ties departures since the 
days of Koon, this Note proposes a uniform departure standard that 
would curb unwarranted sentencing disparity and trigger meaningful 
judicial analysis of family circumstances.201 
IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
In addressing the issues inherent in the current standard for family 
ties and responsibilities departures, the most efficient way to affect 
                                                 
196 Id. at *11.  In Justice, the court mused that “prisons are filled with men who are 
fathers. . . . Circumstances that might justify a departure would include a situation where 
the young child has serious health problems and requires constant care.”  Id.  The court also 
recognized departure may be warranted for a male defendant where “there was no mother 
or other family members present to care for the child, and a lengthier term of incarceration 
would result in the father losing custody of the child to the state permanently.”  Id.; see 
United States v. Rose, 722 F. Supp. 2d 1286, 1290 (M.D. Ala. 2010) (granting departure 
based on family ties where the male defendant helped care for his girlfriend’s nephew and 
provided substantial financial support).  But see Bush, supra note 46, at 197 (recognizing 
that loss of financial support can have a devastating impact on and serious consequences 
for the family, especially regarding children). 
197 See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s 
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general). 
198 See Bush, supra note 46, at 197 (directing courts to rely on concrete evidence in 
assessing the defendant’s family role). 
199 See supra Part II.C (discussing the differing district court standards for family ties 
departures under Koon and following amendments to the Guidelines). 
200 See supra Parts III.A–B (analyzing continuing issues in disparate departures and 
judicial reliance on stereotypes without objective inquiry in family ties departures under 
Koon and the amended Guidelines). 
201 See infra Part IV (proposing amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 regarding family 
ties departures). 
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change in court application is by amending the Guidelines.  Although 
district court judges retain authority to vary from the Guidelines under 
the post-Booker advisory regime, the Guidelines still carry weight in 
sentencing analysis.202  Judges must first calculate the applicable 
Guideline range and then determine whether a departure is warranted 
before considering a variance.203  Further, even where courts determine 
departure is not warranted, such courts may also consider family 
circumstances in alternatively determining whether a variance is 
warranted.204  Thus, an amendment to the Guidelines will inform judicial 
determinations of departures, as well as variations. 
A. Guidelines Amendment  
Guidelines section 5H1.6 should first be amended to direct courts to 
focus on the impact that a sentence has on the defendant’s family.  
Second, the policy statement should be amended to include a non-
exhaustive list of objective factors that would aid the court in assessing 
the defendant’s actual role in his or her family. 
§ 5H1.6 Family Ties and Responsibilities (Policy Statement)  
In sentencing a defendant . . . family ties and responsibilities are not 




1. Circumstances to Consider.— 
(A) In General.—In determining whether a departure is warranted 
under this policy statement, the court shall consider the 
following non-exhaustive list of circumstances: 
(i) The seriousness of the offense. 
(ii) The involvement in the offense, if any, of members of the 
defendant’s family. 
(iii) The danger, if any, to members of the defendant’s family as 
a result of the offense. 
                                                 
202 Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 349–50 (2007).  In Rita, the Court emphasized that 
the Guidelines should still carry substantial weight because they reflect data collected over 
“tens of thousands of sentences” and thus provide a rough approximation of sentences that 
would achieve the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a).  Id. at 349–50. 
203 See supra notes 94–95 and accompanying text (providing the “guidelines-first” 
approach to sentencing determination adopted after Booker). 
204 See supra note 147 and accompanying text (discussing courts’ consideration of family 
ties in determining whether to vary from the Guidelines according to the § 3553(a) 
sentencing factors). 
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(B) Departures Based on Loss of Caretaking or Financial Support.—
A departure under this policy statement shall be based on the loss 
of caretaking or financial support of the defendant’s family 
requires.  iIn addition to the court’s consideration of the non-
exhaustive list of circumstances in subdivision (A), departure 
requires the presence of the following circumstances: 
(i) The defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable 
guideline range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific 
loss of essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to 
the defendant’s family. 
(ii) The loss of caretaking or financial support substantially 
exceeds the harm ordinarily incident to incarceration for a 
similarly situated defendant. . . . 
(iii) The loss of caretaking or financial support is one for which 
no effective remedial or ameliorative programs reasonably 
are available, making the defendant’s caretaking or financial 
support irreplaceable to the defendant’s family. 
(iv) The departure effectively will address the loss of caretaking 
or financial support. 
(C) Essential Caretaking or Essential Financial Support.—In considering 
whether the defendant’s service of a sentence within the applicable 
guidelines range will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss of 
essential caretaking, or essential financial support, to the defendant’s 
family described in subdivision (B)(i), the court should consider the 
following non-exhaustive list of factors: 
(i) The defendant’s caretaking role in his or her family unit, supported 
by evidence from ties in the community as well as experts 
specializing in family dynamics. 
(ii) The consequences to the defendant’s family resulting from the loss 
of the defendant’s income upon incarceration, supported by 
evidence of such consequences. 
(iii) The age of the defendant’s dependents. 
(iv) Whether the defendant’s dependents have special needs or medical 
conditions. 
(v) The availability of alternative caretakers in the defendant’s family 
or community upon the defendant’s incarceration. 
(vi) In cases involving minor dependents, whether the defendant’s 
incarceration presents the risk of loss of custody.205  
                                                 
205 The proposed amendments are italicized and are the contributions of the author.  The 
text that has not been italicized represents the language as it appears in the original policy 
statement and has been maintained to provide context. 
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B. Commentary  
Guidelines section 5H1.6 should first be amended to mandate that 
departure “shall be based on loss of caretaking or financial support of 
the defendant’s family” and “requires the presence of the following 
circumstances.” By amending the language to mandate loss of essential 
caretaking or financial support, the application note will set forth a 
uniform standard for district courts determining whether to depart 
based on family ties and responsibilities.  This standard properly focuses 
on the negative impacts of the defendant’s incarceration on innocent 
family members, as well as society, and thus will aid courts in alleviating 
those harms through family ties departures.206  Mandating this standard 
will help ensure that courts no longer apply inconsistent standards 
across jurisdictions, resulting in unwarranted departure disparities.207    
Because mere application of the “loss of essential caretaking or 
financial support” standard would provide sentencing judges with too 
much discretion, section 5H1.6 should also be amended to include 
objective factors to aid courts in determining whether the defendant’s 
incarceration will cause a substantial, direct, and specific loss.208  In 
applying these objective factors, courts will be better able to assess the 
actual roles played by defendants within their respective family units 
and thus the impact that incarceration would have on the defendant’s 
family.209  In order to assess the defendant’s role as caretaker, the court 
should require objective evidence that supports the defendant’s claim.210  
The court should also require similar objective evidence to assess the 
detrimental impact that would ensue from the loss of the defendant’s 
                                                 
206 See supra Part II.B (discussing the detrimental and costly effects of a defendant’s 
incarceration on his or her family members as well as society in general). 
207 See supra Part II.C (explaining the differing family ties departure standards utilized by 
courts under Koon and subsequent amendments to the Guidelines); see also supra Part III.A 
(analyzing continuing unwarranted disparities in family ties departures resulting from the 
application of inconsistent departure standards). 
208 See supra Part III.B (analyzing continuing issues in courts’ departure analysis even 
where courts considered the effect of incarceration on the defendant’s family). 
209 See King, supra note 11, at 302 (“A departure decision should not be made on the basis 
of gender but rather on the basis of specific attributes or circumstances of the defendant.”). 
210 See, e.g., United States v. Crawford, No. 07-CR-73, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8 (E.D. Wis. 
Aug. 22, 2007) (considering objective evidence in assessing the defendant’s role as the 
family caretaker).  In Crawford, the court considered letters from a community pediatrician, 
therapist, as well as an Early Childhood Special Education Teacher.  Id.  The letters 
described the defendant as “the best person to care for her children,” as well as an integral 
component in creating a stable, loving environment for her children.  Id.  One critic 
similarly directs courts to rely on concrete evidence to assess the defendant’s parenting 
skills.  Bush, supra note 46, at 197.  Such evidence is important in sentencing because judges 
typically are not in a position to evaluate family environments, unlike social workers or 
family court judges.  Id. 
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financial support.211  This would lessen the opportunity for judicial 
reliance on stereotypical assumptions of females as “caretakers” and 
males as mere “breadwinners.”212  Further, courts should consider the 
dependents’ age and special needs, as well as the existence of alternative 
caretakers, and the likelihood that parental rights will be terminated, in 
order to gauge the gravity of harm caused by incarceration.213  This non-
exhaustive list of objective factors will aid judges in focusing more on the 
defendant’s actual family situation rather than reverting to their own 
unfounded, stereotypical views.  
Critics will argue that the proposed amendment will fail to produce 
uniformity in family ties departures and will also argue that the 
proposed amendment creates poor public policy by creating a sentencing 
loophole for offenders merely because they have a family.  The proposed 
amendment addresses the former argument because application of a 
consistent standard, albeit one that includes a list of non-exhaustive 
factors, will nonetheless dramatically decrease disparity and better 
achieve the goals of sentencing uniformity.214  The proposed amendment 
also addresses the latter argument because courts will engage in an 
objective analysis and act consistent with public policy by disfavoring 
lesser sentences for defendants based on the mere existence of family 
members.215  Application of these objective factors will ensure that 
departure is granted only where incarceration would surely cause 
unwarranted harm.  Further, because sentencing judges are required to 
balance the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) against departures 
under the Guidelines, this provides further assurance that courts will 
impose lesser sentences only when warranted.216  In sum, analysis under 
the proposed standard will result in more uniform and meaningful 
family ties departures. 
                                                 
211 See supra note 47 and accompanying text (recognizing the detrimental effects that loss 
of a defendant’s financial support would entail for his or her family). 
212 See supra Part III.B (analyzing judicial application of unfounded gender stereotypes in 
family ties departures without objective inquiry into the facts of a case). 
213 See supra notes 47–49 (discussing how the harm and social cost of incarceration is 
influenced by the innocent family member’s age and special needs, the lack of alternative 
caretakers other than the state, and the possibility that defendants may lose their parental 
rights); see also Crawford, 2007 WL 2436764, at *8 (considering the age and special needs of 
the defendant’s children, the availability of alternative caretakers, and the risk that the 
defendant would lose her parental rights upon incarceration). 
214 See supra note 31 and accompanying text (providing the purpose and goals behind 
promulgation of the SRA). 
215 See supra note 53 and accompanying text (discussing policy arguments against 
considering the defendant’s family at sentencing). 
216 See supra note 93 (providing the sentencing factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)); 
see also supra note 95 and accompanying text (discussing the amendments to Guidelines 
section 1B.1 Application Instructions following Booker). 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
Following the Supreme Court’s departure standard articulated in 
Koon, federal courts adopted varied departure standards regarding 
family ties and responsibilities.  In doing so, courts failed to effectuate 
the purposes underlying the Guidelines and effectively combat the 
unwarranted harm experienced by a defendant’s family members upon 
incarceration.  In applying these varying departure standards, courts 
created disparities in departures between similarly situated defendants, 
contrary to sentencing goals of uniformity.  Further, while many 
standards ignored the detrimental effects of incarceration on the family, 
those that appeared to focus on such harm were applied without 
meaningful, objective analysis and allowed for dated stereotypes to 
influence departure decisions.  While amendments to Guidelines section 
5H1.6 presented courts with an opportunity to get it right, history 
repeated itself.  
In order to solve this continuing conundrum in family ties 
departures, section 5H1.6 must undergo further amendment so that it 
mandates a uniform and objective departure standard.  Under this 
standard, Linda Smith, John Doe, and Michelle Johnson would 
experience a greater degree of fairness in sentencing under the 
Guidelines.217  In comparing Linda’s and John’s similar family 
circumstances under the proposed amendment, application of that 
standard would produce a uniform result—most likely a successful 
departure for both—because the courts would delve into the actual 
family circumstances faced by both defendants.218  In comparing John’s 
and Michelle’s family situations, application of the proposed standard 
would again bring about different results.  Here the courts would set 
aside any assumptions associating Michelle as a “caretaker” and John as 
a mere “breadwinner” and then would objectively analyze the 
defendants’ family roles under the proposed factors.219  Thus, John 
would likely receive departure although Michelle would not.220  
                                                 
217 See supra Part I (presenting a hypothetical based on three defendants’ motions for 
departure based on family ties). 
218 Based on the simplified hypothetical, both Linda and John play an active role in their 
families.  They both supply the primary means of financial support while maintaining an 
active caretaking role as well.  Each defendant also has young children, at least one of 
which has special needs.  The presence of these factors likely show that the family’s loss 
upon the defendant’s incarceration would be substantial.  See supra Part II.B (discussing 
factors related to family harm caused by incarceration).  Thus, upon a showing of factual 
evidence, the court would likely depart in both instances. 
219 Michelle’s previous success in obtaining a departure indicates the court based its 
decision on gender stereotypes.  There the court ignored the fact that Michelle’s children 
spent most of their time with grandparents and were older in age.  In granting departure 
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Although Booker ushered in a renewed sense of judicial discretion in 
federal sentencing, uniformity remains a vital and important sentencing 
goal.  Therefore, family ties departures must be applied in a consistent 
manner in order to avoid unwarranted disparity.  Given the high cost of 
incarceration to innocent family members and society in general, the 
departure standard should focus on the harmful effects of incarceration 
to the family.  However, if these goals are to ever be realized, courts 
must apply family ties departures in a meaningful and objective way.  
The proposed amendments to Guidelines section 5H1.6 would provide 
the means to realize those goals. 
Brittany P. Boatman* 
                                                                                                             
the court likely assumed that Michelle played a vital caretaking role in the lives of her 
children.  See supra Part III.B (analyzing courts’ reliance on the notion of women as natural 
caretakers in family ties departures).  John’s previous failure likewise indicates that the 
court based its decision on the idea of the male “breadwinner” defendant.  Under the 
assumption, John was not viewed as a caretaker despite evidence to the contrary.  Rather, 
as a “breadwinner” John was unable to meet the higher departure threshold.  See supra Part 
III.B (analyzing courts’ reliance on the notion of men as natural “breadwinners,” rather 
than caretakers, in family ties departures). 
220 Application of the proposed objective factors would show that John plays an active 
role in his family, especially to his young children, one of which has special needs, and he 
provides key financial support.  Michelle, on the other hand, plays less of an active role in 
her family that includes two teenage children.  Based on these simplified factors, it is likely 
that John’s family would suffer greatly upon his absence while Michelle’s family would 
likely not.  See supra Part II.B (discussing factors related to family harm caused by 
incarceration). 
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